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THE ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION
KENNETH CULP DAVISt
THE Administrative Procedure Act to the contrary notwithstanding,
administrative proceedings are not limited to rule-making, adjudica-
tion, and licensing. 1 Some administrative proceedings are investiga-
tions-proceedings designed to produce information. Investigations
are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule-making,
adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising
and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending legis-
lation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure
areas to find out what if anything should be done.
The story of the development of the administrative power of investi-
gation is rather dramatic. As regulation has expanded and intensified,
the administrative quest for facts and more facts has gained momentum
and has seemingly become an irresistible force. This force has collided
with what at first were apparently immovable constitutional principles
concerning privacy, searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and free-
dom from bureaucratic snooping. The constitutional principles re-
mained firm for a time but gradually weakened and crumbled. The
force proved irresistible. Remnants of the constitutional principles are
left standing, but, only to an extent clearly consistent with permitting
administrative agencies freely to secure factual materials needed to
carry out the programs they administer.
t Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. Subsection (g) of Section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Sr.AT. 237
(1946), 5 U.S.C.A_ § 1001 (g) (Supp. 1946) provides that "'Agency proceeding' means
any agency process as defined in subsections (c), (d), and (e)." These three subsec-
tions deal respectively with rule-making, adjudication, and licensing. Since adjudication
is defined as agency process other than rule-maling, it is arguable that an investigation,
not being rule making, is necessarily adjudication. But that strains too much the ac-
cepted meaning of adjudication.
Questions of substance may hinge on the definition of "agency proceeding." For
instance, Section 6(a) gives the right to be represented by counsel to "any person com-
pelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof" and to "every
party.., in any agency proceeding." This apparently changes the law of Bowles v.
Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (C. C. A. 7th 1944), holding that witnesses subpoenaed in an adminis-
trative investigation may be denied representation by counsel. But a party or itness
not compelled to appear is given the right to be represented by counsel only in an "agency
proceeding," and that term apparently does not include a formal hearing in an investiga-
tion. Yet Section 6(b) refers to "a nonpublic investigatory proceeding."
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The clash between official fact-gatherers and interests of privacy is
probably about as old as organized government. 2 Oppressive use of
writs of assistance (general search warrants) contributed substantially
to the movement which became the American Revolution. 3 The first
i Iportant skirmish in the modem development came in 1881, when
the civil liberties fortifications built around privacy were found impen-
'etrable even by direct exertion of the great power of Congress; the Su-
preme Court, in holding that the House of Representatives could not
enforce a subpoena issued by a congressional committee in the course
of an investigation, asserted that neither house of Congress "possesses
the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citi-
zen." 4 This particular point was not captured by the attackers until
1927, when the congressional power to punish a recusant witness for
contempt was at last recognized. I Early in the twentieth century the
defenders won again when the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted a
statute conferring a power of investigation upon the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. The Court held that the Commission could not
compel testimony in order to secure imformation to aid in recommend-
ing legislation." The holding rested less on statutory language than on
prevailing mores: ". . . the power to require testimony is limited, as it
usually is in English-speaking countries, at least, to only the cases where
the sacrifice of privacy is necessary,-those where the investigations
concern a specific breach of the law." 6 The attackers ,came back with
the added strength of new legislation and prevailed on this point in
1917. 7 When in 1924 the Federal Trade Commission sought informa-
tion about statutory violations without showing probable cause and
without framing its demand in specific terms, the attackers were se-
2. For a valuable historical account going back to biblical and Roman times, see
the first chapter of LASsoN, THE HIsToRY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENV-
MENT (1937).
3. Writs of assistance (deriving their name from their command to all officers to as-
sist in their execution) gave continuous authority to petty officers to search at will
wherever they suspected smuggled goods to be. Of a speech by James Otis in 1761 John
Adams said: "I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis's oration against writs
of assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life." 10 WORES OF JOHN ADAMS 276
(1856). See the second chapter of LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEV-LOPMENT OF TIE
FOURTH AMENDIENT (1937). For a brief historical summary, see Fraenkel, Concenting
Searches and Seizures 34 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1921). For the development in Great
Britain, see CLolim and ROBINSON, ROYAL ComMiSSIoNS OF INQUIRY (1937).
4. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881).
5. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See Landis, Constlitutlional Lindia-
tions on the Congressional Power of Investigation 40 HARv. L. REY. 153 (1926) ; Herwitz
and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee 33 COL. L. REV. 1 (1933) ; Mc-
GEARY, THE DEVELOPMENTS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER (1940).
6. Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1908).
7. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917). The new legislation is discussed below at
p. 1117.
[Vol. 56: 11111112
1947] ADIINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION 1113
verely denounced by Mr. Justice Holmes for a unanimous Court: "Any-
one who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amend-
ment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize
one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire
. . . and to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the pos-
sibility that they niay disclose evidence of crime . .. It is contrary
to the first principles of justice to allow a search through all the respond-
ents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something wAll
turn up." 8 The latest significant triumph of the defenders came in
1936, when the Supreme Court, although dealing with a mere attempt
of an administrative agency to get information, talked somewhat in-
temperately of "odious" practices and of "intolerable abuses of the
Star Chamber," and quoted with approval a nineteenth-century state-
ment of a lower court: "A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, com-
pulsory investigation, conducted by a commission without any allega-
tions, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or of
evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice, is unknown
to our constitution and laws; and such an inquisition would be destruc-
tive of the rights of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny." 1
The spirit behind statements of this kind became utterly exhausted
by 1940 when the Supreme Court denied certiorari after a lower court
had rendered a clear-cut holding that an agency may inspect books and
records "regardless of whether the business is a public utility and re-
gardless of whether there is any pre-existing probable cause for believ-
ing that there has been a violation of the law." 10 The doctrine has
recently developed that records required by statute or regulation are
"quasi-public" records not subject to immunities applying to private
records and may therefore be inspected by administrative officers
without any showing of probable cause, the privilege against self-in-
crimination affording no protection. 1 In 1943 the Supreme Court
held that a district court must enforce a subpoena duces tecum at the
instance of an administrative agency, not only in the absence of a show-
ing that the company whose records were sought was subject to the
regulatory jurisdiction of the agency but even in the absence of a show-
ing of probable jurisdiction. 12 In 1946 the Supreme Court made clear
that an administrative subpoena duces tecum will be judicially enforced
if "the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the
8. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 293, 305-6 (1924).
9. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936), quoting from In re Pacific Railwiray Com-
mission, 32 Fed. 241, 263 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
10. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 390 (C. C A. 7th 1940), cerl.
denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
11. See, e.g., Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91 (C. C. A. 3d 1945). This and similar cases
are discussed below at pp. 1136-8.
12. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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-power of Congress to command"; this applies not only to adjudications
and to investigations relating to law enforcement but also to "general
or statistical investigations authorized by Congress."" And in 1947
the Supreme Court held that in absence of statutory provision or legis-
lative history affirmatively denying the power of delegation, an admin-
istrator may delegate to regional administrators and district directors
the power to sign and issue subpoenas. 14
THE NATURE OF THE INVESTIGATING POWER
The administrative power of investigation includes detective work
like that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and such units as the
Interstate Commerce Commission's Bureau of Inquiry, laboratory
work exemplified by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Standards,
and the collection and analysis of social science materials by such agen-
cies as the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Agri-
culture Department's Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and the now
defunct National Resources Planning Board. Yet these are not the
types of investigation here involved. The investigating power about
which the many legal battles have been fought relates to compelling
testimony, inspecting or ordering production of books and records, re-
quiring the keeping of records in accordance with designated forms, and
commanding that questionnaires be answered or that reports be made
to administrative authorities.
Far more than law enforcement is involved. The administrative
power of investigation is of course essential to law enforcement, but its
most significant functions probably relate to the exercise of other ad-
ministrative powers. The power of investigation is part and parcel of
the prosecuting power and of the practically more important power of
supervision which grows out of the prosecuting power. The Federal
13. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
14. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking and Lumber Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1129 (1947). The
Mohawk case distinguished Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942) on the
grounds that (1) when Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act involved in the
Ctudahy case, a provision authorizing delegation of the subpoena power was eliminated
by a conference committee, whereas a Senate Committee said the Price Control Act au-
thorized the Administrator to delegate "any of the powers given to him by the bill"; (2)
the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically delegated some other powers, thus negativing
power to delegate the signing and issuing of subpoenas; (3) the Fair Labor Standards
Act was dependent on the Federal Trade Commission Act having a history of its own;
(4) the Price Control Act, unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act, granted a broad rule-
making power, which the Court said "may itself be an adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it
has been withheld"; and (5) the Price Control Act contained no provision negativing au-
thority to delegate the subpoena power. In the Mohawk case, Mr. Justice Jackson was
alone in expressing concern that delegation of the subpoena power should not be coupled
with automatic court enforcement of subpoenas and that the Supreme Court's decisions are
tending in the direction of automatic enforcement.
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Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervise
the banking of the nation largely through the power of investigation,
only rarely resorting either to adjudication or to rule-making. Fraud
in securities is controlled primarily by a system of compulsory disclo-
sures. The appropriate agency usually conducts a proceeding to inves-
tigate the causes of accidents of trains, ships, and airplanes. Investi-
gations are often conducted to determine general policies; for instance,
in its 1946 annual report the Federal Communications Commission
discusses a "general public hearing to determine what changes, if any,
should be made in present policies on allocation of clear channels in
the standard broadcast band." 15 Such general policy determination
may relate to adjudication, to rule-making, to prosecuting, to super-
vising, or to all of those and more. 16 The flavor of what administrative
investigation is becoming is well conveyed by twvo sentences in the 1946
annual report of the Civil Aeronautics Board: "The first postwar year
of Board operations was marked by a considerable number of investi-
gations in all phases of civil aviation. The Board was concerned with
pilot fatigue as related to air safety, universal air travel on a credit
basis, fire prevention in aircraft, the development of air freight, matters
relating to nonscheduled air transportation, and a series of problems
involving intercorporate relationships." 17 During 1945 and 1946 the
Federal Power Commission conducted a large fact-finding investiga-
tion into the conservation and utilization of natural gas, including in-
quiry into (1) reserves, known fields, prospective discoveries and field
life calculations, (2) production practices and problems, (3) extent and
control of physical waste, (4) state laws governing production, waste,
and conservation, (5) utilization of natural gas, "end use" such as for
carbon black, boiler fuel, imports, and exports. 18 In an appendix to
15. 12 FCC AxN. REP. 10 (1946).
16. For instance, the Federal Communications Commission's investigation of networl:
control of local stations led to regulations providing that licenses would not be issued to
stations having designated provisions in their contracts with networks. This cuts across
both rule-making and adjudication. A description of the investigation is presented in the
opinion in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193-6 (1943). In
1941 the Commission instituted an investigation to determine what policy or rules, if any,
should be promulgated concerning the acquisition of broadcasting stations by newspapers.
In its 1941 annual report, the Commission said: "Such questions ... may be settled, as
in the past, in the consideration of particular cases as they arise, or they may be the sub-
ject of a general determination of Commission policy or of new legislation." 7 FCC Az~za.
REP. 25 (1941). After investigating, the Commission decided not to adopt any general
rule, but to submit a summary of evidence to congressional committees and to announce
that the Commission will not deny a license merely because the applicant is engaged in
newspaper publishing but vill prevent "concentration of control in the hands of the few
to the exclusion of the many who may be equally well qualified." 10 FCC Az:.;. RP-. 7
(1944).,
17. 6 CAB Ax-. REP. 2 (1946).
18. 26 FPC Ax. REP. 66 (1946).
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its 1944 annual report the Federal Trade Commission describes each
of about 125 investigations made since 1915, some requested by Con-
gress or by one House, some by the President, some by another agency,
and some instituted by the Commission of its own motion. In its 1946
annual report the Commission describes its general investigations of
international phosphate cartels, of the wholesale baking industry, and
of resale price maintenance. In addition, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion made 370 wartime cost-finding inquiries in 1917-18, and 300 inves-
tigations at the instance of the War Production Board during one year
of the Second World War. 11 The Interstate Commerce Commission's
rate-structure investigation, made pursuant to the Hoch-Smith resolu-
tion of Congress, has been called "the most far-reaching and important
one ever entered upon by the Interstate Commerce Commission or by
any other human tribunal among civilized peoples." 20 The record was
155,000 pages, plus more than 11,000 exhibits.
Administrative investigations are intertwined with congressional
investigations, which in recent years have become far more numerous
than ever before. Congressional committees sometimes seek informa-
tion to guide legislation, sometimes investigate in order to supervise
administration, and sometimes intend merely to provide favorable
or unfavorable publicity about some group or cause. The Truman
Committee will be long remembered for its contributions to efficient
prosecution of World War II, as will the Dies Committee for its public-
ity techniques. One of the greatest investigations of all time was that
of the Temporary National Economic Committee, composed of three
Senators, three Representatives, and six administrative officers repre-
senting the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, Labor,
and Commerce. Facts developed by the TNEC will provide source
materials for economists in and out of government for years to come.
Special agencies are often established for the sole purpose of conducting
investigations. One type of such special investigating agency is exem-
plified by the Commission on Industrial Relations set up in 1912, and
by the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement
(Wickersham Commission) created in 1929. Congress created another
type of t~mporary agency in 1940, the Board of Investigation and Re-
19. 30 FTC ANN. REP. 2, 3, 85-100 (1944).
20. The statement is made by Commissioner Aitchison, quoted in Att'y Gen.
Comm. Ad. Proc. Monograph, Interstate Commerce Commission 95 (1940). See the de-
scription of ICC general investigations in the Monograph at pp. 93-8. Some investiga-
tions are very narrow-into a single rate between two points on one commodity. A large
investigation into freight forwarding was in large measure a general fishing expedition to
see what might turn up; it led to both legislative and administrative action. Investigations
may be conducted before drafting regulations, as in the case of hours of service of motor
carriers, or to secure criticisms of proposed regulations, as in the case of motor carrier
safety regulations.
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search, to make inquiries into questions of transportation which the
Interstate Commerce Commission had not adequately studied. More
often Congress or congressional committees utilize existing agencies
for conducting investigations. Whether or not instituted at the in-
stance of Congress, administrative investigations often lead to legisla-
tion. An outstanding example was an investigation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission of investment trusts; not only was a com-
prehensive report made to Congress, but through the investigation the
terms of a compromise bill were agreed upon between representatives
of the industry and the Commission, and the bill thus prepared passed
both houses of Congress unanimously.
21
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Federal statutes setting up regulatory agencies uniformly confer
broad powers of investigation, although detailed provisions vary con-
siderably from agency to agency. Narrow judicial interpretations have
given rise to strikingly large grants of power. The Interstate Commerce
Commission was initially empowered "to obtain from such common
carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the Com-
mission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was
created," and "for the purposes of this act .. . to require, [by sub-
poena,] the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents re-
lating to any matter under investigation." 22 The Supreme Court in
1908 emphasized the words, "for the purposes of this Act," and held
that the Commission could investigate only matters that might have
been made the object of a complaint, and not matters which would
merely assist in recommending additional legislation. 23 Congress then
amended the statute to authorize the Commission "to institute an in-
quiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing con-
cerning which a complaint is authorized to be made, to or before said
commission by any provision of this Act, or concerning which any
question may arise under any of the provisions of this Act, or relating
to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act."2 4 The Su-
preme Court in 1917 upheld the power of the Commission to investigate
railroad expenditures for political purposes, saying that ". . . it is not
far from true-and it may be it is entirely true, as said by the Commis-
sior-that 'there can be nothing private or confidential in the activities
and expenditures of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce.' " 25 This
21. 10 SEC ANN. RE,. 157-8 (1944).
22. 24 STAT. 379, 383 (1887).
23. Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1903).
24. 36 STAT. 539, 551 (1910), 49 U.S.C. §13 (2) (1940).
25. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33, 43 (1917).
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theory that carriers are "agents of the public" has ever since assisted
in judicial approval of investigations by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 216
The Interstate Commerce Act also empowers the Commission to
prescribe forms of accounts and records, and provides: "The Commis-
sion shall at all times have access to all accounts, records, and memo-
randa, including all documents, papers, and correspondence now or
hereafter existing,.and kept or required to be kept .. .and it shall be
unlawful for such carriers to keep any other accounts, records, or memo-
randa than those prescribed or approved by the Commission." 27
When in 1914 Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act,
it had the advantage of knowing the Supreme Court's narrow construc-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act and accordingly resorted to ex-
ceedingly broad language: "The commission shall also have power .. .
to gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from
time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and man-
agement of any corporation engaged in commerce," except banks and
certain common carriers, and to require such corporations "to file with
the commission in such form as the commission may prescribe, annual
or special .. . reports or answers in writing to specific questions, fur-
nishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation
to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective
corporations . .." 28 The Commission is further empowered to make
public the information obtained, except trade secrets and names of
customers, to make annual and special reports to Congress with recom-
mendations for legislation, to have access to documentary evidence,
and to subpoena witnesses and "all such documentary evidence relat-
ing to any matter under investigation . " 29
The later statutes setting up regulatory agencies have similarly con-
ferred full powers of investigation. Thus, the Securities Exchange
Act, 19 the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 3' the Natural Gas
26. See the discussion of the role of the concept of business affected with a public in-
terest as it affects the investigating power, pp. 1136-8.
27. 41 STAT. 493 (1920), as amended, 54 STAT. 916 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 20 (5) (1940).
The Commission is empowered by § 20(1) to require annual, periodical or special reports,
and to rectuire "specific and full, true, and correct Answers to all questions upon which
the Commission may deem information to be necessary . . ." §20(7) provides for forfei-
ture to the United States not to exceed $500 for each day of failure or refusal to submit
accounts, books, records, memoranda, correspondence, or other documents. Numerous
other provisions concerning investigations run through the Act.
28. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §46(a) and (b) (1940).
29. 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1940).
30. 48 STAT. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1940).
31. 49 STAT. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(r) (1940).
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Act, 32 and the Federal Power act 33 authorize investigations for pur-
poses of enforcement, for prescribing rules or regulations, and for ob-
tamining information to serve as a basis for recommending legislation.
The powers granted by the Civil Aeronautics Act, 34 the Communica-
tions Act, 11 the Emergency Price Control Act, " and the Atomic En-
ergy Act 37 are very general but do not specifically authorize investiga-
tions for recommending legislation. All these statutes confer powers
to subpoena witnesses and records in the exercise of the powers of in-
vestigation.
A good deal of significance should be attached to the reiteration of
congressional will in all these statutes. Not a single important regula-
tory statute fails to provide broad powers of investigation supported
by powers to compel production of evidence. At the time when the
courts were seemingly trying to limit the power of investigation to
businesses affected with a public interest, 31 or to law enforcement and
quasi-judicial proceedings, 11 Congress continued to enact new legis-
32. 52 STAT. 828 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717(m) (1940).
33. 49 STAT. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825(f) (1940).
34. 52 STAT. 1000 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 487 (Supp. 1943). The Board may require an-
nual, monthly, periodical and special reports, and "specific answers to all questions upon
which the Board may deem information to be necessary." The Board prescribes forms of
accounts, records, and memoranda, to which the Board has access, as well as access to
lands, buildings, and equipment
35. Under 48 STAT. 1094 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1940), the Commission is author-
ized to institute an inquiry on its own motion "in any case and as to any matter or thing
concerning which complaint is authorized to be made ... or concerning which any ques-
tion may arise under any of the provisions of this Act, or relating to the enforcement of
any of the provisions of this Act." Under 48 STAT. 1096 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §409 (1940),
the Commission may "require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of all books, papers, schedules of charges, contracts, agreements, and docu-
ments relating to any matter under investigation.'
36. 56 STAT. 30 (1942), as amended, 58 STAT. 637 (1944), 50 U.S.C §922(a) (Supp.
1944) authorizes the Administrator "to make such studies and investigations, to conduct
such hearings, and to obtain such information as he deems necessary or proper to assist
him in prescribing any regulation or order under this Act. .. ." The Administrator is
also authorized to subpoena witnesses and records, and to require certain persons to furnish
information, to keep records, to make reports, and to permit inspections.
37. Pub. L. No. 585, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a) (3) (Aug. 1, 1946) provides that
the Atomic Energy Commission may "make such studies and investigations, obtain such
information, and hold such hearings as the Commission may deem necessary or proper to
assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act, or in the Administration or en-
forcement of this Act, or any regulations or orders issued thereunder. For such purposes
the Commission is authorized . . . by subpena to require any person to appear and
testify, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place."
38. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924), declaring that
"The mere facts of carrying on a commerce not confined within state lines and of being
organized as a corporation do not make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad com-
pany now may be." See discussion, infra. p. 1136.
39. See discussion, infra, p. 1120.
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lation granting powers to investigate irrespective of these limitations.
Firm legislative insistence on full powers of administrative investiga-
tion has undoubtedly been a substantial factor in the final defeat of the
attempt to protect private records from exposure to governmental
agencies. 40 State legislative enactments expressing the same general
view have also contributed. '1
SUBPOENAS IN SUPPORT OF PROCEEDINGS UNRELATED TO
ADJUDICATION OR TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
In the simple society of the nineteenth century the occasion for Com-
pelling disclosure of private information seldom arose except in con-
nection with litigation in court and grand jury or other proceedings
looking to law enforcement. Near the end of that century a federal
court could expect general acceptance of a statement that "intrusion
into, and compulsory exposure of, one's private affairs and papers,
without judicial process, or in the course of judicial proceedings . . . is
contrary to the principles of a free government, and is abhorrent to the
instincts of Englishmen and Americans." 42 In its 1908 decision in
Harriman v. ICC the Supreme Court held through Mr. Justice Holmes
that subpoenas could not be used by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in investigations made for purposes of recommending legis-
lation, since "[ihe power to require testimony is limited . . . to
* . . cases . . . where the investigations concern a specific breach of
the law." 41 In FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 14 the Federal Trade Com-
mission sought to compel production of records in a general investiga-
tion, pursuant to a Senate resolution, into the relation betveen prices
of grain at the farm and export prices. The lower court said that the
question was whether the Commission might inspect papers "whenever,
in the judgment of the commission, such inspection may furnish infor-
mation of value to an inquiry it is making as to some economic or com-
mercial problem, and when it has no reason to believe that any violation
of law has been committed." 41 The court went on to say that such a
power would be "beyond any power which Congress can confer. ," 41
40. See Handler, The Constitutioality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Com-
inission 28 CoL. L. REv. 708, 905, 925-8 (1928) for references to many federal statutes
conferring powers of investigation upon officers and agencies.
41. As a sample of state legislation on the administrative powers of investigation,
Mr. Handler presents a very impressive catalog of New York legislation. Id. at 928-9.
42. Mr. Justice Field, in In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 251
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
43. 211 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1908).
44. 284 Fed. 886 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1924).
45. 284 Fed. 886, 888 (D. Md. 1922).
46. Id. at 890.
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The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. "I In 1919 the House
of Representatives requested the Federal Trade Commission to investi-
gate the cost of living, and Congress appropriated O150,000 for the in-
vestigation. A district court enjoined enforcement of an order of the
Commission requiring information, and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed in 1923, 11 largely on the ground that the
steel, iron and coal businesses under investigation were beyond the
interstate commerce power, but partly on the ground of lack of any
complaint charging violation of law and that the investigation "ieems
to be more in the nature of a news-gathering expedition, in hope of
securing something of public interest for publication, or possibly sub-
ject-matter for future legislation by Congress." 41 The case was argued
twice before the Supreme Court, and finally, in 1927, eight years after
the investigation was authorized, the Supreme Court held that the
remedy at law was adequate and that the bill should have been dis-
missed for want of equity. r0
As recently as 1936, in the unusually extreme case of Jones v. SEC, 51
the Supreme Court held that enforcement of a subpoena should be
denied even where the purpose seemed to be law enforcement. The
Securities Act of 1933 gave the Commission authority to issue a sub-
poena "for the purpose of all investigations which, in the opinion of
the Commission, are necessary and proper" for the enforcement of this
act. 52 Jones filed a registration statement, which he then withdrew.
The Commission refused to consent to the withdrawal and issued a
subpoena duces tecum for the purpose of securing information as to
possible falsity of representations in the registration statement. The
Supreme Court held that the Commission could not prevent with-
drawal of the registration statement, and went on to reason that "since
here the only disclosed purpose for which the investigation was under-
taken had ceased to be legitimate when the registrant rightfully with-
drew his statement, the power of the commission to proceed with the
inquiry necessarily came to an end . . . further pursuit of the inquiry,
obviously, would become what Mr. Justice Holmes characterized as
'a fishing expedition . . .'!-an undertaking which uniformly has met
with judicial condemnation." 5
47. 267 U.S. 586 (1924). The affirmance vwas on the authority of FTC v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
48. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936 (App. D. C. 1923).
49. Id. at 941.
50. 274 U.S. 160 (1927). See the full discussion of the case by Handler, The Con-
stitutionality of Inwestigations by the Federal Trade Commission 28 CoL L. RE%,. 703, 905
(1928).
51. 298 U.S. 1 (1936). Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, JJ., dissented. See the criticism
of the case in LA-DIS, TaE ADmixisTRATr= PRocEsS 136-40 (1938).
52. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77(s) (1940).
53. 298 U.S. 1, 26 (1936).
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These various authorities show overwhelmingly that the law once was
firmly established against the use of subpoenas for investigations not
related to adjudication or to law enforcement. Yet in statute after
statute Congress has continued to confer upon administrative agencies
the powers of subpoena not only for adjudication and law enforcement
but also for rule-making, for recommending further legislation, and for
other purposes. The multiplication of agencies, the complexities of
their regulatory tasks, the obvious necessity for securing information,
and the growing recognition of public interest in regulated businesses
all conspired against the judicial position. Writing in 1926, Mr. Lilien-
thal surveyed the authorities, weighed the pragmatic considerations,
and said: "The question is still open: Can an administrative tribunal
. . . compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses when the facts
sought by it are not to be used in the enforcement of existing law?" "1
Another writer concluded an article in 1933 with the gloomy observa-
tion: "The review of the cases here undertaken seems to indicate that
except for judicial or quasi-judicial inquiries, only Congress or its com-
mittees can conduct an investigation into the private affairs of indivi-
.duals." 65
Congress persisted. Still more statutes authorized use of subpoenas
for making rules, for recommending legislation, for gathering informa-
tion to be used in ways not defined in advance. The urgency of the
demand for information persisted. Acceleration in growth of regulatory
powers enhanced the need for factual materials and the awareness of
that need. The agencies themselves persisted. Investigations unrelated
to adjudication or law enforcement increased by leaps and bounds. The
pressures of public opinion persisted. More and more government
regulation became the accepted order of the day, investigations by
agencies and by congressional committees became increasingly familiar,
and aspects of economic life once considered private came to be re-
garded as part of the public domain. The temper of the times was
changing, and the authoritative judicial pronouncements embodied
54. Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony 39 I-IARV.
L. Ray. 694, 713 (1926).
55. Langeluttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administrative Power of Investigation
28 ILL. L. REV. 508, 523 (1933).
The general subject has produced a wealth of literature. See especially Landis, Coni-
stitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation 40 HARV. L. RV. 153
(1926) ; Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion 28 CoL. L. Rav. 708, 905 (1928) ; MacChesney and Murphy, Investigatory and En-
forcement Powers of the Federal Trade Commission 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 581 (1940);
Sherwood, The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas 44 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1944) ;
Note, Investigatory Powers of Congress and Administrative Agencies 26 WAsH. U. L. Q.
531 (1941); Comment, Investigatory Powers of the Securities and Exchange Comnnission
44 YALE L. J. 819 (1935); Note, Validity of Subpoenas Duces Tecum Issned by Federal
Administrafive Bodies, 86 U. oF PA. L. Ra,. 420 (1938).
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social philosophies which were on the wane. In these circumstances,
effective law sometimes changes even in absence of judicial declaration
or legislative enactment. Authorities permitting subpoenas for pur-
poses other than adjudication or law enforcement, considered narrowly
without reference to changed conditions, are weaker than clear-cut
holdings the other way, and yet it is unthinkable that the Supreme
Court today would refuse to permit the use of compulsory process to
secure information for any administrative purpose which is regarded
as legitimate. The older authorities, analytically stronger, have now
been fully superseded by the later authorities, analytically weaker. 5
As early as 1917 Smith v. ICC 67 held that new legislation permitted
what the Court forbade in the Harriman case of 1908-general inquiry
into railroad expenditures made for political purposes-on the theory
that "it may be it is entirely true, as said by the Commission-that
'there can be nothing private or confidential in the activities and ex-
penditures of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce.' ", But the
Commission's investigation was prompted by a complaint as well as by
a resolution of the Senate.
In 1927 the old holding in Kilbourn v. Thompson " that Congress
itself could not enforce a subpoena issued in the course of a legislative
investigation finally gave way. .AcGrain v. Daugherty 19 renounced
the former view that neither house of Congress "possesses the general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen," 11 and
announced an opposite rule: "Ve are of opinion that the power of in-
quiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate aux-
iliary to the legislative function." 62 If Congress, or either house there-
of, may delegate a general investigating power to a committee, which
in turn delegates in part to the committee's staff, it becomes very diffi-
cult to maintain the position that the same power may not be delegated
56. In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 1Ml, 202 (1946), the
Court distinguishes cases of actual search and seizure from cases involving judicial en-
forcement of subpoenas and says: "The confusion is due in part to the fact that this is the
very kind of situation in which the decisions have moved vAth variant direction, although
without actual conflict when all of the facts in each case are taken into account. Notwith-
standing this, emphasis and tone at times are highly contrasting, with consequent over-
tones of doubt and confusion for validity of the statute or its application."
The Court's observations are well supported. But much of the apparent confusion
and variant direction of the decisions yields to heavy emphasis on dates of cases; with
some exceptions, the later the case the broader the power of investigation. On the narrow
subject of investigations unrelated to adjudication or law enforcement, the key is not
confusion or variant direction so much as it is law in process of gradual change.
57. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
58. Id. at 43.
59. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
60. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
61. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (181).
62. 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
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to an administrative agency. The McGrain holding necessarily would
encompass an investigating body like the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee, composed of three Senators, three Representatives,
and six administrative officials. The same principle should apply to
the situation in Hearst v. Black, 61 where the Senate investigating com-
mittee secured the assistance of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in enforcing a subpoena against telegraph companies.
Long-standing tradition permits the use of subpoenas in aid of grand
jury proceedings. 14 The authorities are now clear that the same may
be done in aid of the administrative counterpart of grand jury proceed-
ings-law enforcement investigations preceding the issuance of formal
complaints. Thus, in enforcing a subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in an investigation one purpose
of which was to determine whether or not a recommendation of crim-
inal prosecution should be made to the Attorney General, a court was
quite content with the mere observation that the investigation was
analogous to that of a grand jury. 65 Another court held that subpoenas
were enforceable although the investigation was not held in public and
although the witnesses were denied representation by counsel. 11 De-
spite the absence of a clear-cut provision in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act conferring on the Board a subpoena power in support of an
investigation preceding the filing of a complaint, the exercise of such
power has been upheld. 67 If disclosures may be compelled for investi-
gations which may or may not lead to prosecutions, consistency seems
to require similar compulsion for investigations for making rules or
planning legislation.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court permit administrative agencies
to compel disclosure of business facts, apart from adjudication or speci-
fic charge of law violation, although neither case involved the discre-
tionary use of a subpoena. In ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co. 11 the Court
upheld Commission orders prescribing methods of accounts and re-
quiring a financial report. These orders were not required because of
a complaint but were general regulations applicable to a class of car-
63. 87 F2d 68 (App. D.C. 1936). After the Senate Committee requested the Com-
mission's assistance, the agents of the Commission "took possession of the felegraph com-
panies' offices and examined wholesale thethousands of private telegraph messages received
and dispatched therefrom over a period of seven months." Id. at 70. The court held the
"dragnet" seizure beyond the Commission's authority. The case is significant here only as
an illustration of cooperation between a congressional committee and an agency.
64. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928).
65. Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (C.C.A. 9th 1938). See also Woolley v.
United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (C.C.A. 9th 1938).
66. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (C.C.A. 7th 1944).
67. NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F.2d 583 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 55 HARv. L. Rzv. 134
(1941).
68. 224 U.S. 194 (1912).
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riers. In Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC C9 the Court's language in
holding that the Commission may require submission of information
in the form of a registration statement went far beyond the necessities
of the immediate case: "Information bearing upon activities which are
within the range of congressional power may be sought not only by
congressional investigation as an aid to appropriate legislation, but
through the continuous supervision of an administrative body." 70 The
authority of these two cases is weakened by the fact that regulations of
general applicability which prescribe in advance the type of informa-
tion open to administrative scrutiny may well be regarded as less dan-
gerous than power to command a particular party to disclose informa-
tion which the agency seeks for special purposes.
7 1
The most reliable authority, even if only a dictum, is a statement by
the Supreme Court in 1946 in Oklalwma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling: "It
is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pur-
suant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully au-
thorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command." 72 Re-
cent decisions of lower courts have in various circumstances specifically
upheld administrative power to compel disclosures for purposes related
neither to law enforcement nor to adjudication. 13
69. 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
70. Id. at 437. The Court also declared: "Congress was entitled to demand the fullest
information as to organization, financial structure and all the activities which could have
any bearing upon the exercise of congressional authority." Id. at 441.
71. In Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1937), the Court upheld
an order of the Secretary of Commerce requiring the company to file a copy or summary
of its books and records on designated subjects. The order recited merely that the infor-
mation was "necessary to the proper administration of the regulatory provisions" of the
Shipping Act. The Court, in an opinion preoccupied with other issues, specifically re-
jected the contention that the Secretary could require production of records only in hear-
ings upon complaints of violations.
72. 327 U.S. 186, 203-9 (1946). The Court went on to say: "This has been ruled
most often perhaps in relation to grand jury investigations, but also frequently in respect
to general or statistical investigations authorized by Congress." The Court cited authori-
ties which analytically fall considerably short of supporting the second half of the state-
ment. The technique seems to be the familiar one of changing the law without appearing
to do so.
73. Stahlman v. Federal Communications Commission, 126 F2d 124 (App. D.C. 1942)
(subpoena enforced to guide rule-making) ; Federal Trade Commission v. National Biscuit
Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (subpoena enforced to support investigation of
agricultural income pursuant to resolution of both houses of Congress) ; United States v.
Cream Products Distributing Co., 156 F.2d 732 (C.C.A. 7th 1946) (no charge of viola-
tion required; lawfully authorized purpose within power of Congress to command is
enough) ; Bowles v. Northwest Poultry and Dairy Products Co., 153 F2d 32 (C.C.A. 9th
1946) (admission of the law violations charged held no defense to enforcement of sub-
poena, because subpoena need not relate to law enforcement) ; Provenzano v. Porter, 159
F.2d 47 (C.C.A. 9th 1946-7), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 1303 (1947) (subpoena enforceable ir-
respective of probability of law violation).
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The highly crystallized law that subpoenas could be enforced only
in connection with law enforcement or adjudication was embodied in
Supreme Court holdings. In a narrow sense such holdings outweigh
the opposing authorities-oblique and possibly distinguishable 7 4 Su-
preme Court decisions, a 1946 dictum of the Supreme Court, and deci-
sions of lower courts. But the recent authorities are in agreement with
the temper of the times and the earlier ones are not. No qualification
is now needed for the proposition of law that lack of relation to law en-
forcement or adjudication is no longer a ground for refusing to enforce
a subpoena issued by an administrative agency.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." Neither the literal language of the Amendment
nor the history which led to its adoption supports the idea that the
Amendment limits the use of judicially enforceable subpoenas which
require testimony or the production of designated books and records.
Writs of assistance during the colonial period had given continuing
authority to lowly officers to search private premises at will for smug-
gled.goods, and the adoption of the Fourth Amendment was a direct
response to that experience. 75 The Amendment's prohibition of un-
reasonable searches and seizures might well have been limited to what
the words cover--searches and seizures. But the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States 71 contained a dictum ex-
tending the effects of the Amendment. Referring to a 1765 judgment
of Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 77 the Court said that "it is
not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense . . . but any forcible and com-
pulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to
be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is
74. An advocate may argue: The McGrain case is different because that was Con-
gress and not an agency; the Goodrich Transit and Electric Bond and Share cases are
distinguishable for the two independent reasons that they involved regulations equally
applicable to all and not orders framed for particular respondents, and that they involved
public utilities and not ordinary businesses; the Isbrandlsen-Moller case is weak au-
thority because the Court did not seem to give its attention to this issue; the Oklahoma
Press case is only dictum; and some of the lower codrts' decisions rest in part upon the
idea of "quasi-public" records, which is not applicable in all cases.
75. See LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FourTu AM ENOMSENT
c. 2 (1937).
76. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
77. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1074 (1765).
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within the condemnation of that judgment." 78 This idea was furthered
by the 1906 decision in Hale v. Henkel, in which the Court said that
"an order for the production of books and papers may constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment." do
The objection was to the breadth of the order-compelling a witness
to produce all his papers in the hope of finding something relevant may
be regarded as the equivalent of a search.
Except for limitations concerning breadth and relevancy, c the
Fourth Amendment does not now restrict an administrative subpoena
for records or an administrative requirement of reports. In the Okhla-
homa Press case of 1946 the Supreme Court emphasizes that objections
under the Fourth Amendment to a subpoena duces tecum are answered
by the simple observation that such a subpoena involves "no question
of actual search and seizure .. .. "81 Later in the same opinion the
Court declares: "The primary source of misconception concerning the
Fourth Amendment's function lies perhaps in the identification of cases
involving so-called 'figurative' or 'constructive' search with cases of
actual search and seizure."8 2 The Court seems intent upon burying
the Boyd dictum and reverting to a more natural meaning of searches
and seizures. 83
78. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
79. 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
80. The problem of the breadth of the order is discussed infra, pp. 1129-34.
81. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946).
82. Id. at 202. The Court also refers to "confusion obscuring the basic distinction be-
tween actual and so-called 'constructive' search." 327 U.S. at 204. Even as early as
1911 the Court held that a suitably specific and reasonable requirement that reports be
furnished does not involve "the faintest semblance of an unreasonable search and seizure."
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 622 (1911).
In Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 145 (1937), the Court said
with respect to an order of the Secretary of Commerce requiring the filing of a copy or
summary of books and records: "The argument that the order amounts to an uneasonable
search and seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, is answered by the fact that it
does not call for the production or inspection of any of appellant's books or papers."
83. Lower courts are picking up the refrain; e.g., Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278, ,M0
(C. C. A. 3d 1946) : "We deal here with no case of administrative agents swooping into
offices and sweeping up records to be used in prosecutions. Actually no physical search
and seizure occurred."
Of course, restrictions remain on actual searches and seizures. Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). But a warrant authorizing even the invasion of the privacy
of a home may be based on no more than an affidavit of probable cause. Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925) (the home was also being used as an illegal winery). The
Supreme Court has recently held that the scope of a search incident to an arrest may b2
broader for public documents (ration coupons) than for private records, Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), and that one supplying goods to the government may by con-
tract waive the protection, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). In Harris v. United
States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947) the Court, five to four, weakened substantially the protec-
tion of a home against searches and seizures.
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The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling any person "in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself." Although as an original prop-
osition one might think that a compulsory disclosure of records is not
forcing a person to be a witness against himself, yet the Boyd case gave
impetus to using the Fifth Amendment to limit orders compelling pro-
duction of records. The Court in the Boyd case said that with respect to
production of records the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "run almost in-
to each other." 84 Subsequent history is largely one of escaping the effects
of the Boyd dictum. There are three principal routes of escape. (1)
Statutes customarily provide that no person shall be excused from testi-
fying or from producing documentary evidence on the ground of self-
incrimination, but that no natural person shall be prosecuted for any
act about which he gives evidence in obedience to a subpoena. 81 Such
an immunity provision is sufficient to permit compelling the production
of self-incriminating evidence. 86 (2) The doctrine is now firmly estab-
lished that corporations- are not privileged against furnishing self-in-
criminating evidence, and that representatives of corporations acting
in their official capacity have no privilege against self-incrimination. 87
The Supreme Court has recently extended this doctrine to unincorpor-
ated labor unions and their officers. 88 (3) The latest circumvention of
the self-incrimination restriction is through the theory that records
which a statute or regulations require to be kept are "quasi-public"
records having special attributes. Thus, a circuit court of appeals has
recently held: "These books and documents here sought are quasi-
84. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
85. In 1893 the Interstate Commerce Act was amended by the Compulsory Testimony
Act, so as to provide in effect that no person shall be excused on the ground of self-
incrimination from giving evidence in obedience to a subpoena of the Commission, but that
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction . . . concerning which he may . . . produce evidence . . . in obedi-
ence to its subpoena . . ." 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. §46 (1940). The Emergency
Price Control Act, like many other federal statutes, provided for application of the Com-
pulsory Testimony Act, including the immunity provision. In United States v. Shapiro,
159 F.2d 890 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), the defendant was convicted partly on the basis of evi-
dence he had produced in response to a subpoena issued under the Price Control Act. The
defendant contended that the immunity provision of the Compulsory Testimony Act was
applicable. The court rejected the contention, holding that the immunity provision does
not apply to "public documents" such as records required to be kept under the Price Con-
trol Act. The court pointed out that applying the immunity provision would "destroy the
value of record-keeping requirements." Id. at 893.
86. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). A weaker immunity provision had previ-
ously been held insufficient in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Immunity
from state prosecution is not essential to validity of a federal statute requiring a witness
to testify despite self-incrimination. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
87. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944) ; Essgee Co. v.
United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
88. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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public records and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not extend to such records." 89
In the Oklahoma Press case the Court reviewed the cases and con-
cluded: "Without attempt to summarize or accurately distinguish all
of the cases, the fair distillation, in so far as they apply merely to the
production of corporate records and papers in response to a subpoena
or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction, seems
to be that the Fifth Amendment affords no protection by virtue of the
self-incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its offi-
cers; and the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against abuse
only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required
to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are
relevant. The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in
terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable." "
Thus in final analysis the protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures and against compulsory self-incrimination do not now
prevent or even substantially hamper administrative authorities from
compelling production of reports and records, so long as subpoenas
comply with requirements with respect to breadth and relevancy.
LIMITATIONS CONCERNING BREADTH AND RELEVANCY-
"FIsHING EXPEDITIONS"
Roving inquiries into private books and records are strongly con-
demned in the older cases. In FTC v. Amricait Tobacco Co., 'I Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes speaking for a unanimous Court lashed out against the
practice of conducting "fishing expeditions into private papers on the
possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime . . . . It is con-
trary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through all the
respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something
will turn up." Complaints had been filed with the Federal Trade Com-
mission charging the respondents with regulating prices at which their
commodities were resold, and the Commission was conducting an in-
vestigation pursuant to a Senate resolution. The Commission ordered
the American Tobacco Company to produce all letters and telegrams
received from or sent to all of its jobber customers during 1921, and
ordered P. Lorillard Company to produce all letters, telegrams or re-
89. Hagen v. Porter, 156 F2d 362, 367 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), ccrt. dcni cd, 67 Sup. Ct. 85
(1946) (the court added for good measure that a statutory immunity provision was appli-
cable); accord, Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278, 280 (C. C. A. 3d 1946) ("The papers in
question are considered public records required by law ... and thus the individual re-
spondents may not rely on the privilege").
90. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 126, 208 (1946). See Note, Rights
of Witnesses in Adininistratve Investigations, 54 Htmv. L. Rzv. 1214 (1941).
91. 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
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ports from or to its salesmen, or from or to all tobacco jobbers' or whole-
sale grocers' associations, all contracts or arrangements with such as-
sociations, and correspondence and agreements with a list of corpora-
tions named. Although the Court denied enforcement of the subpoenas,
the Court emphasized that the Commission claimed "an unlimited
right of access to the respondents' papers" with reference to possible
violations of the statute, and stated in the last paragraph of the opinion:
"We have considered this case on the general claim of authority put
forward by the Commission" '92 The narrow holding therefore was not
that the subpoenas were too broad but that the claim of unlimited ac-
cess to papers should be denied. 91 Indeed, other parts of the opinion
make clehr that subpoenas of the kind here issued might be enforced
if a showing were made of the relevancy of the records to the inquiry.
Not only was the Court's principal objection to the subpoenas its aver-
sion to "a search through all the respondents' records, relevant or irrel-
evant, in the hope that something will turn up," but the Court declared:
"The right of access given by the statute is to documentary evidence-
not to all documents, but to such documents as are evidence. . . .Some
evidence of the materiality of the papers demanded must be produced." 04
Thus the objection is not to breadth but to lack of a showing of material-
ity. This conclusion gains support from other decisions, both earlier
and later.
The outstanding earlier case is Hale v. Henkel, holding a subpoena
duces tecum "far too sweeping in its terms." 11 The subpoena required
production of all understandings, contracts or correspondence between
the company and six different companies, all reports made and ac-
counts rendered by such companies, and all letters received by the com-
pany since its organization from more than a dozen different companies,
The Court said that a subpoena requiring production of all the com-
pany's records "would scarcely be more universal in its operation, or
more completely put a stop to the business of that company." 11 But
the Court also observed: "Doubtless many, if not all, of these docu-
ments may ultimately be required, but some necessity should be shown,
either from an examination of the witnesses orally, or from the known
transactions of these companies with the other companies implicated,
or some evidence of their materiality produced, to justify an order for
the production of such a mass of papers."
Brown v. United States 1' is the leading case for relaxing the restric-
92. Id. at 305, 307.
93. This is essentially the way the Court explains the case in Oklahomia Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 207 n. 40 (1946).
94. 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
95. 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
96. Id. at 77.
97. 276 U.S. 134 (1928) ; accord, Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S.
541 (1908) ; see Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
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tions on broad subpoenas. The case involved a grand jury proceeding
under the Sherman Act against an association of furniture manufac-
turers, whose agent was ordered to produce all letters and telegrams
to and from its predecessor, its members, and the members of its pre-
decessor, during a period of three and one-half years, relating to the
sale of case goods, and particularly with reference to eighteen desig-
nated subjects. 11 Distinguishing the Hale case, the Court upheld the
subpoena, declaring that it specified a reasonable period of time, and
specified the subjects with reasonable particularity.
More recent case law definitely reflects a weakening of the inhibition
against fishing expeditions. The Court in the Oklahomna Press case ex-
presses an attitude having hardly anything in common -ith the Ameri-
can Tobacco opinion. The Court laid don the broad standard that the
requirement of particularity "comes do-wn to specification of the docu-
ments to be produced adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of
the relevant inquiry. Necessarily, as has been said, this cannot be re-
duced to formula; for relevancy and adequacy or excess in the breadth
of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes
and scope of the inquiry." 1 More is to be learned from specific ex-
98. The particularization of the subjects of investigation undoubtedly contributed sub-
stantially to the reasons for upholding the subpoena. If the subpoena had required specified
records "relating to the manufacture and sale of case goods," and had stopped there, it
would have been less likely to gain judicial favor than the subpoena in the form in which
it was issued. That subpoena required specified records "'relating to the manufacture and
sale of case goods, and particularly with reference to-(a) general meetings of Alliance
[the National Alliance of Furniture Manufacturers] (b) zone meetings of Alliance mem-
bers (c) costs of manufacture (d) grading of various types of case goods (e) issuing new,
price lists (f) discounts allowed on price lists (g) exchanging price lists (h) maintaining
prices (i) advancing prices (j) reducing prices (k) rumors of charges of price cutting
(1) discounts, terms, and conditions of sale, etc. (in) curtailment of production (n) the
pricing of certain articles or suits of furniture by W. H. Coye (o) cost bulletins (p) in-
tention of "XV. H. Coye and A. C. Brown to attend furniture markets or expositions at
Jamestown, N. Y., Grand Rapids, M6fich., Chicago, IlL, and New York City, N. Y., and
meetings of members held prior to and during said furniture markets or expositions (q)
conditions obtaining at various furniture markets or expositions at Jamestown, N. Y.,
Grand Rapids, Mich., Chicago, Ill., and New York City, N. Y., (r) manufacturers main-
taining a fair margin of profit between cost prices and selling prices."' Brown v. United
States, 276 U.S. 134, 138 (1928) (excerpt from the actual subpoena).
99. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). Apparently no
contention was made in the Supreme Court that the subpoena v-as too broad. It required
production of "'books, papers, and documents showing the hours worked by, and vages
paid to, each of your employees between October 29, 1938, and the date hereof, including
all payroll ledgers, time sheets and cards, and time clock records, and all your books, pa-
pers and documents showing the distribution of papers, out of the state of Oklahoma, the
dissemination of news outside of the state of Oklahoma, and the source and receipt of
advertisements of nationally advertised goods." 147 F.2d 658, 659 (C. C. A. 10th 1945).
About as good a general statement as any is the simple one in Detweiler Bros. v.
Walling, 157 F.2d 841, 843 (C. C. A. 9th 1946): "The only limitation upon the scope of
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amples of subpoenas held valid or invalid. The most revealing opinions
are those of circuit courts of appeals.
In Smith v. Porter, "I an OPA subpoena of June 17, 1946, was fpheld
which required production of "the articles of partnership, bank state-
ments and cancelled checks from.January 1, 1943, copies of federal in-
come tax returns for 1943, 1944, and 1945, general accounts, physical
inventories for the years named, general ledger accounts and financial
statements for those years together with copies of contracts in effect
during that period, correspondence files, copies of sales invoices, bills
of lading or other shipping papers, and all vouchers or purchase in-
voices." 101 As to materiality of all these records, the circuit court of
appeals said merely: "Considering the enumerated papers as a whole
they appear to us probably relevant to an investigation to be conducted
under the Price Control Act." 102 No mention was made of the Htale
or American Tobacco cases, and none of the flavor of those cases is dis-
cernible.
United States v. Cream Products Distributing Co. 103 involved an in-
vestigation by the War Food Administrator. The company argued
that because the investigation was limited to an inquiry into use of
milk solids in frozen dairy foods, compelling the production of all re-
cords relating to purchases and sales was improper. The court thought
this argument worth no more than a one-sentence reply-to the effect
that the statute authorized the Administrator to make such investiga-
tion as may be necessary or appropriate in his discretion to the enforce-
ment or administration of the Act, and to require production of any
records which may be relevant to the inquiry. The admonition of Mr.
Justice Holmes in the American Tobacco opinion that evidence of ma-
teriality must be producedwas ignored.
In SEC v. Vacuum Can Co., 104 an investigation was conducted on the
complaint of Pothast into the question whether Mayer had violated
the statute. A subpoena required production, inter alia, of a stock cer-
tificate book and ledgers. The company offered to produce only those
portions which specifically referred to Mayer, Pothast and others by
name. To the company's contention that other parts of the records
were not relevant to the investigation, the court replied: "The purpose
of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge,
but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies ...
The investigation here was one authorized by law, and the evidence
the Administrator's inquiry is that the records demanded be reasonably relevant to the
matter in issue."
100. 158 F.2d 372 (C, C. A. 9th 1946).
101. Id. at 373.
102. Id. at 374.
103. 156 F.2d 732 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
104. 157 F2d 530 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 770 (1947).
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sought to be produced was material and relevant to the investiga-
tion." 105 The court was not at all impressed with the idea that mate-
riality must be shown.
In Provenzanw v. Porter, 106 a subpoena required production of "em-
ployees' individual time-cards and payroll records, sales and general
ledgers, and other records" concerning costs and selling prices. The
court rejected the fishing expedition argument by saying: "The records
and data called for are of the character ordinarily thought relevant and
material to an investigation under the Price Control Act. . . . In the
course of his administration of the act the Administrator is empowered
to conduct investigations for the purpose of placing dealers in commod-
ities and services in their proper category under the regulations; and
it is plain that the records ordered produced in this instance are relevant
to a lawful inquiry." 107 Porter v. Gantner & Maltern Co. 113 involved
what the court described as "a formal requirement for inspection of por-
tions of [the company's] books." The district court held it lacked juris-
diction to enforce an "inspection requirement." The circuit court of
appeals reversed, saying that nothing of substance hinges on the differ-
ence between a "subpena" and an "inspection requirement." Cases
such as these seem to involve fishing expeditions in the sense in which
the old courts used that term, but modem courts are unperturbed by
the evils the old courts saw in such practices. 1*1 The motivating ques-
tion is: How could programs such as those administered by the OPA
be carried out unless the agency can get at the business facts?
Recent cases refusing enforcement to subpoenas for reasons relating
to breadth or relevancy are rare. An example is Sholkin v. Nelson. 110
The War Production Board, investigating compliance with an order
concerning fluorescent lights, required an electric company to produce
"all sales invoices, purchase orders, preference rating records, accounts
receivable, notes receivable, bookkeeping journals and general ledgers,
and all inventories taken in 1943... showing the purchase, ownership and
sale of electrical and light fixtures and supplies by you and by all and
any of the companies ... named, during the years 1943 and 1944."
105. Id. at 532; accord, McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 3S9 (C. C A. 10th 1945).
106. 159 F.2d 47 (C. C. A. 9th 1947), cert. denicd, 67 Sup. Ct. 1303 (1947).
107. Id. at 48-9.
108 156 F.2d 886 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
109. For example, a subpoena has been upheld requiring certain telegraph companies
to produce all telegrams sent or received by named parties concerning specified subjects,
over periods of as long as eleven months. Newield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 709 (C. C. A. 5th
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 729, 36 Micy. L. Rav. 786 (1938). Another case enforced a
subpoena of the Fair Labor Standards Administrator for records shoving vages, time-
clock cards, and hours scheduled during a six months period for each department in the
Kansas City branch of a national mail order company. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 114 F2d 384 (C. C. A. 7th 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
110. 146 Fl2d 402 (C. C. A. 10th 1944).
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The court emphatically rejected the contention that the general form
of the subpoena was too broad, saying that "subpoenas requiring the
production of all documents relative to an inquiry have been consis-
tently sustained by the courts." "I Yet, since the investigation was
into fluorescent lights and since the subpoena required records concern-
ing all electrical fixtures whether or not they were subject to the WPB
order involved, the court held the subpoena too broad." 2
The Administrative Procedure Act provides: "No process, require-
ment of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand shall
be issued, made, or enforced in any manner or for any purpose except
as authorized by law." 13 These words taken at face value seem to say
that existing law shall continue. The Attorney General, whose agree-
ment to the bill was important to its passage, said that this provision
"istates existing law." "I The Senate committee said that this provi-
sion "is designed to preclude 'fishing expeditions' and investigations
beyond the jurisdiction or authority of an agency." "I The House com-
mittee made a similar statement, and went on to say: "Investigations
may not disturb or disrupt personal privacy, or unreasonably interfere
with private occupation or enterprise." 116 This legislative history prob-
ably lays some slight foundation for an argument that the Act changes
the law, but such an argument seems unlikely to prevail.
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES
BEYOND THE AGENCY'S JURISDICTION
Several federal decisions have held that agencies whose regulatory
powers rest on the interstate commerce clause may not require produc-
tion of records concerning intrastate activities. "I For instance, when
111. Id. at 404, 405.
112. Perhaps some significance with reference to fishing expeditions is found in the
Supreme Court's 1947 opinion in Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 920 n.3, 922 (1947),
holding that a district court should have sent to jail one who refused to obey a court or-
der enforcing a subpoena issued by the Commission. Counsel had argued before the district
court: "We have in mind that these books and records may disclose certain acts other than
those charged in the indictment." Mr. Justice Douglas said for the Court: "The records
might well disclose other offenses against the Securities Act of 1933 which the Commission
administers." The attitude seems not much different from saying that the Commission
may search through the records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something may
turn up. How remote-how very remote-is the eleven-year-old view of Jones v. SEC,
298 U.S. 1 (1936) !
113. 60 STAT. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(b) (Supp. 1946).
114. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 410 (1946). 'The Senate Judiciary
Committee Print of June, 1945, also said that § 6(b) "states the established limitations."
Id. at 27.
115. Id. at 205.
116. Id. at 264.
117. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936 (App. D. C. 1923), rev'd on other
grotunds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927); FTC v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 Fed. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1922),
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the Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to a request of the House of
Representatives that an investigation be made of the cost of living,
sought to compel disclosure of information concerning steel, iron, and
coal businesses, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held:
"The powers of the Commission are limited to matters directly rele-
vant to interstate commerce. In other words, the corporation under
investigation must not only be engaged in interstate commerce but the
subject under investigation must be so related to interstate commerce
that its regulation may be accomplished by act of Congress." 115
This view seems clearly unsound and is unlikely to be followed. The
court confused power to obtain information with power to regulate;
the scope of the one power may not properly be measured by the scope
of the other. For example, no one would deny that a federal court hav-
ing jurisdiction over a subject matter may use its subpoena power to
compel disclosure of facts concerning activities relevant to the case but
not subject to federal regulation; surely the same is true of administra-
tive adjudication. The proper test of the power of a federal agency to
obtain information is not federal regulatory power over the activities
to which the information relates but is the relevancy of the information
to an inquiry which the agency has power to make. If an agency is au-
thorized to conduct an investigation for purposes of making rules or
planning legislation, the agency's subpoena power, unless otherwise
limited, extends to all information relevant to the investigation.
A 1912 decision of the Supreme Court, reaffirmed in 1941, enunciates
this principle. The Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed uni-
form systems of accounts for carriers and required reports respecting
their corporate organization and financial condition. One carrier op-
erated amusement parks and objected to including in the orders details
concerning wholly intrastate business. In upholding the orders, the
Court carefully distinguished the power to compel disclosures from the
power to regulate: "It is a mistake to suppose that the requiring of in-
formation concerning the business methods of such corporations, as
shown in their accounts, is a regulation of business not within the juris-
diction of the Commission. . . .The requiring of information concern-
aff'd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 293 (1924) ; FTC v. Smith, 34 F.2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
The first case is criticized adversely in Handler, The Constlitutionalily of Invesligalions by
Yhe Federal Trade Commission, 28 Coi. L. REv. 703, 905, 91&-23 (1928), and the later cases
are criticized adversely in MfacChesney and Murphy, Investigatory a:d Enforcement Poelrs
of the Federal Trade Comminsion, 8 Gao. NVAsr. L. Rav. 581, 585-6, 593-4 (1940).
118. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936, 941 (App. D. C. 1923). The court %vent
on to say that the investigating power extends to those intrastate affairs which are so in-
tertwined and intermingled with interstate affairs as to be inseparable, but that in this
case there was no such intermingling. See MacChesney and Murphy, Ivesligalory, ard
Enforcenmkt Powers of the Federal Trade Commission 8 GEo. W.,sir. L. REv. 531, 84-7
(1940).
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ing a business is not regulation of that business." 119 In sustaining the
constitutionality of the Wage-Hour Act in 1941, the Court incidentally
upheld a requirement that certain records of wages and hours be kept.
The Court remarked in passing that "the requirement for records even
of the intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to the legitimate
end." 120
To the general observation that an agency having authority to make
an investigation may compel disclosure of all information relevant to
the investigation, irrespective of the scope of the agency's regulatory
power, an exception must be noted to the effect that when the purpose
of compelling a disclosure is not to secure information for governmen-
tal purposes but is to use the power of compelling the disclosure as a
sanction for producing a desired regulatory effect, the agency's action
is necessarily limited by the scope of its regulatory power. If the agency
may not regulate, it may not regulate by using publicity as a sanction.
BUSINESSES "AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST";
"QUASI-PUBLIC" RECORDS
Many of the old cases concerning the power of investigation hinged
in part on the concept of business "affected with a public interest." The
Supreme Court in the Smith case quoted with apparent approval the
view of the Interstate Commerce Commission "that 'there can be noth-
ing private or confidential in the activities and expenditures of a carrier
engaged in interstate commerce.' " 21 A few years later in the Ameri-
can Tobacco case the Court cited the Smith case and said: "The mere
factsof carrying on a commerce not, confined within state lines and of
being organized as a corporation do not make men's affairs public, as
those of a railroad company now may be." 122 In the Baltimore Grain
case the investigation was blocked because the inquiry concerned what
the court called "nonpublic service corporations," 123 but Bartlett Fra-
zier held that restrictions on disclosures by private businesses "cannot
be applied to regulations which require reports and disclosures in respect
119. ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 211 (1912).
120. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941). In Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937) it was held that the Illinois Commerce Commission could
require production of records and require reports from a foreign corporation which was
engaged in interstate commerce and beyond the Commission's regulatory power. In Flem-
ing v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F2d 384, 392 (C. C. A. 7th 1940), cerl. dcned, 311
U.S. 690 (1940), the court specifically rejected a contention that a subpoena for records
must be limited to employees who are not exempt from the Act.
121. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33, 43 (1917).
122. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924).
123. FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886, 889 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 267 U.S.
586 (1925).
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to a business which is affected with a public interest." 124 Other cases
have drawn the same distinction. 125
The-concept of business affected with a public interest has now dis-
appeared from federal constitutional law. 12 , Every business is affected
with 'a public interest to whatever ex'tent Congress or a state legislature
chooses to make it so. No longer does due process of law confer immun-
ity from such regulation as legislative bodies see fit to provide. Accord-
ingly, the cases which forbid investigations of businesses not affected
with a public interest can no longer be controlling authority. Just as
Congress may require railroad records to be kept open to governmental
inspection under the Interstate Commerce Act, 1.7 Congress may now
similarly require ordinary businesses to keep and to permit inspection of
records concerning, say, wages and hours, 12 or any other subject rele-
vant to an inquiry which Congress has power to authorize. Thus, under
the Price Control Act, federal courts have commonly expressed the
view that records required to be kept are "quasi-public records," al-
though the businesses were selling meat, 123 dairy products, "I lum-
ber, "I and fruit and produce. 1312 When a producer of cotton objected
to keeping records and filing reports pursuant to the cotton marketing
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a circuit court of ap-
peals held that the records and reports "are quasi-public documents
. ..open to inspection by such persons and officers as are authorized
under the statute to inspect them." 133
124. Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 351-2 (C. C. A. 7th 1933), ecrt. deied,
290 U.S. 654 (1933).
125. In Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States, 15 F.2d 133, 137 (C. C. A. 7th 1926),
the court agreed that the packing business was "impressed with a public interest," but
denied inspection of records because "we can perceive no very decided difference in prin-
ciple between the Packers and Stockyards Act as applied to the packers and the Federal
Trade Commission Act as applied to the corporations falling within its purview."
126. Of many cases that might be cited for this proposition, probably the best is Olsen
v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), unanimously overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S.
350 (1928) and holding that fees charged by private employment agencies could be
limited by state action. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-9 (1934), seriously
crippled the concept and the Olscn case obliterated it.
127. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
123. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-5 (1941).
129. Bowles v. Insel, 143 F.2d 91 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
130. Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.2d 362 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 85
(1946); Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F.2d 774 (C. C. A. 10th 1944) (poultry
also involved).
131. Porter -. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278 (C. C. A. 3d 1946) ; Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lum-
ber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied on other grounds, 325 U.S. 877
(1945) ; Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Cal. 1944).
132. United States v. Shapiro, 159 F.2d S90 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
133. Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 996 (C. C. A. 6th 1943). The origin of
the idea of "quasi-public" records is probably the opinion in Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 380 (1911), where the Court was discussing the privilege against self-incrimina-
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Despite a rather large number of cases in the last two or three years,
principally OPA cases, resting on the theory of "quasi-public" records,
the assumption is probably unsafe that records not regarded as "quasi-
public" are immune to the same kind of order for inspection or produc-
tion. The theory is probably no more than a technical device invented
to assist the growth of law-and is not likely to be used to prevent further
growth. In Troy Laundry Co. v. Wirtz, "I an argument against enforc-
ing an order of the National Wage Stabilization Board requiring pro-
duction of records was founded on the proposition that no statute re-
quired the records to be kept and that therefore the doctrine of such
cases as the Oklahoma Press case 131 did not apply. The court readily
granted that the Fair Labor Standards Act involved in the latter case
required wage records to be kept and that the Act administered by the
Wage Stabilization Board did not. But the court rejected the conten-
tion with the simple observation that "the reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in the Oklahoma Press case does not rest upon the fact
that the statute required the records to be kept." "I This observation
seems entirely sound, and the Troy Laundry case is probably a fore-
runner of other cases which will hold that inspection or production of
business records not classified as "quasi-public" may be required when-
ever inspection or production of "quasi-public" records may be re-
quired. The concept of "quasi-public" records, having served its pur-
pose, will then disappear.
ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENAS AND OTHER ORDERS
REQUIRING INFORMATION
Despite the apparent paucity of prosecutions under them, "I statu-
tory provisions for penal sanctions for refusal to produce evidence are
very common. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission Act pro-
vides: "Any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify,
tion: "Thus, in the case of public records and official documents, made or kept in the
administration of public office, the fact of actual possession or of lawful custody would
not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was made by himself
and would supply the evidence of his criminal dereliction. . . .The principle applies not
only to public documents in public offices, but also to records required by law to be kept
in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly estab-
lished."
134. 155 F.2d 53 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 66 (1946).
135. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
136. 155 F.2d at 57.
137. Down to 1937 neither the Interstate Commerce Commission nor the Federal
Trade Commission had initiated a single criminal prosecution for failure to provide infor-
mation, and the Securities and Exchange Commission had secured one indictment. See
Note, 51 HARv. L. Rav. 312, 316 (1937). Lack of prosecutions does not prove ineffective-
ness of penal provisions, however.
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or to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce documentary evidence,
if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or l awful require-
ment of the commission, shall be guilty of an offense and upon convic-
tion thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by
a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or by imprisonment
for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 113
Failure to file an annual or special report as required by the Federal
Trade Commission is punishable by forfeiture to the United States of
$100 for each day such failure continues beyond thirty days after notice
of default. 139 Similar provisions are contained in other statutes. I
The main reliance for enforcement of administrative orders requiring
disclosure of information has been a procedure whereby the agency ap-
plies to a court for an order, violation of which is punishable as a con-
tempt of court. In the 1893 case of ICC v. Brimson the Supreme Court
remarked that such a body as the Interstate Commerce Commission
Itcould not, under our system of government, and consistently with due
process of law, be invested with authority to compel obedience to its
orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment." 141 But the Court went
on to hold that a judicial proceeding to enforce a subpoena issued by
the Commission satisfies the "case" or "controversy" requirement of
the Constitution, and that judicial enforcement does not violate the
principle of separation of powers. 142 Accordingly, since 1893 Congress
138. 38 STAT. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §50 (1940).
139. In United States v. National Biscuit Co., 25 F. Supp. 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), it
was held that the $100 per day forfeiture applied only to reports and not to answers to
questionnaires. The Federal Trade Commission sought to recover penalties aggregating
$40,900 for delay in answering questionnaires. The company previously had unsuccess-
fully resisted a mandamus proceeding, and had finally given the Commission all the infor-
mation requested, in compliance with the court's order entered in FTC v. National Biscuit
Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
140. See, e.g., SEC, 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff. (1940) ; ICC,
24 STAT. 386 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 20(7) (1940) (penalty of q0 per day for
failure or refusal to keep records and submit for inspection or copying).
The Supreme Court has held constitutional a statute making refusal to testify before
a Congressional Committee a misdemeanor. Ins re Chapman, 166 U.S. 651 (1S97); see
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
Both Senate and House committees said of §6(c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act: "The subsection expressly recognizes the right of parties subject to administrative
subpenas to contest their validity in the courts prior to subjection to any form of penalty
for noncompliance." Sm. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, 265 (1946). But this
probably means no more than that the penalty cannot be imposed without proving the
validity of the subpoena. See Nathanson, Some Comments on the Admninistrath' Proec-
dure Act 41 ILL. L. REV. 368, 410-2 (1946).
141. 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894).
142. Id. at 489. A federal court had previously held to the contrary in an opinion writ-
ten by Mr. Justice Field. In re Pacific Railway Commission, 33 Fed. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1887). A part of this extreme opinion was quoted with approval by a majority of the
Supreme Court as recently as 1936 in Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936).
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has consistently refused to empower any agency to commit for con-
tempt, customarily providing instead that agencies may apply to the
appropriate district court for an order enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings. 143
Since the probabilities are strong that the present Supreme Court
would not follow the dictum in the Brimson case that an agency could
not constitutionally be empowered to punish for contempt, 144 it is ar-
guable that the present system should be legislatively changed. "I The
proposition that the present system rests on constitutional interpreta-
tions which are no longer valid seem unanswerable. Furthermore, the
procedure requiring agencies to apply to courts for enforcement orders
is needlessly inconvenient and expensive. Yet the prospects for change
seem slight, for the system is familiar, the tradition is of long standing,
and inconvenience and expense result in only a small portion of the
cases.
The Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Penfield Co. v. SEC 148 involved
the power to punish for contempt one who refused to obey a court order
enforcing an administrative subpoena for records. The District court
imposed a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00 which was paid. The Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission contended for a remedial penalty de-
signed to induce production of the records. In the Supreme Court it
was argued that the penalty was criminal and that in absence of appeal
the circuit court of appeals had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
held that inasmuch as the relief the Commission sought was production
143. E.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act typically provides: "In case of dis-
obedience to a subpoena the commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United
States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of docu-
mentary evidence. Any of the district courts of the United States within the jurisdiction
of which such inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a sub-
poena issued to any corporation or other person, issue an order requiring such corporation
or other person to appear before the commission, or to produce documentary evidence if
so ordered, or to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey
such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt.thereof." 38 STAT.
722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §49 (1940).
144. The Brimson case rests on the notion that the contempt power is necessarily judi-
cial. This view has been rejected by later unanimous holdings that legislative bodies may
punish for contempt. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) ; McGrain v. Daugh-
erty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See also the impressive array of state authorities discussed
infra, p. 1141.
145. Such an argument is advanced by Albertsworth, Adminisfrativc Contmpt PowD-
ers: A Problem in Technique, 25 A.B.A.J. 954 (1939) ; accord, Sherwood, The Enforce-
ment of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 COL. L. lav. 531 (1944). But sec Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting in Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 928 (1947) : "It is beside the point to
consider whether Congress was deterred by constitutional difficulties. That Congress
should so consistently have withheld powers of testimonial compulsion from administra-
tive agencies discloses a policy that speaks with impressive significance."
146. 67 Sup. Ct. 918 (1947).
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of the documents, coercive sanctions were appropriate and therefore
the judgment of contempt was civil and not criminal. The Court fur-
ther held that the district court's refusal to grant full remedial relief was
an abuse of discretion. 147
Varying state practices concerning enforcement of subpoenas afford
excellent materials for an empirical study, but the subject as dealt with
by state courts is still largely shrouded in separation of powers concep-
tualism. .14 In view of the Brimson dictum that the power to punish
for contempt may not be conferred on an administrative agency con-
sistently with due process of law, perhaps a good deal of significance lies
in provisions of at least four state constitutions empowering agencies
to punish for contempt, "I and in provisions enacted by at least eleven
state legislatures conferring such power on administrative agencies. 1 1
Despite the Brimson case, at least five state courts have upheld the
constitutionality of statutes conferring the power to commit for con-
tempt upon administrative agencies "I or notaries public. 152 Appar-
ently such provisions have been invalidated in only five states. 153 In
one or two states it has been held that agencies have inherent power to
punish for contempt. 154
147. Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote a concurring opinion devoted to a discussion of the
bearing upon the cise of the holding in United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup.
Ct. 677 (1947), "that civil and criminal contempt could be prosecuted in a single contempt
proceeding conducted according to the rules of procedure applicable in equity causes, and
that both types of relief, civil and criminal, could be imposed in such a mixed proceeding."
Penfield Co. v. SEC 67 Sup. Ct 918, 927 (1947). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom
Mr. Justice Jackson concurred, dissented on the ground that the district court ought not to he
reversed "on the abstract assumption that papers ordered to be produced as relevant to an
inquiry at the time the subpoena issued, continued relevant several months later." Id. at
930.
148. See the excellent summary of cases in Note, 35 CoL. L. Rv. 578 (1935).
149. CAY. COxST. Art. XII, §22 (railroad commission); LA. Co: sr. Art. VI, §4
(public service commission); Ox.A. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 19 (corporation commission);
V.-. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 156(c) (corporation commission).
150. Statutes of eight states were either upheld or invalidated in the cases cited in
notes 151-2 infra. Three statutes whose constitutionality apparently has not been passed
upon are Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 417.030 (Baldwin, 1944); Tnmr.. CoM Azn. § 5403
(Michie, 1938); and TEx. STAT. Art. 6024 (Vernon, 1936).
151. Cf. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911) (board of police com-
missioners) ; Vogel v. Corporation Comnm'n, 190 Okia. 1E6, 121 P.2d 586 (1942), 30 Gro.
L. J. 674; Southern Pac. Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 20, 165 Pac. 303 (1917) (public service
commission).
152. Cf. Dogge v. State, 21 Neb. 272, 31 N.W. 929 (1887) ; In re Merkle, 40 Kan. 27,
19 Pac. 401 (1888).
153. People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931); Roberts v. Hackney, 109
Ky. 265, 58 S.V. 810 (1900) ; In re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 37 Pac. 135 (1894) ; Langenbrg v.
Decker, 131 Imd. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892) ; Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118 (1876).
154. It was clearly so held in In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931) and
somewhat equivocally so held in Ex parte Sanford, 236 Mo. 665, 139 S.V. 376 (1911).
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EXTENT OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY IN ENFORCING SUBPOENAS
The holding in the Brimson case 155 that a proceeding for judicial en-
forcement of a subpoena is a "case" or "controversy" indicates that
the judicial function in such a proceeding involves more than automatic
issuance of an order. A court may always consider such questions as
unreasonable searches and seizures, "I self-incrimination, 1 undue
breadth of the subpoena, 15s improper inclusion of irrelevant informa-
tion, 15 administrative authority to make the barticular investiga-
tion, 160 power to require disclosures concerning activities outside the
agency's regulatory authority, "I' the role of the concept of business
"affected with a public interest," 162 and proper issuance of the particu-
lar subpoena. 163 The two troublesome quesfions are whether or not
in law enforcement proceedings the agency must demonstrate to the
court the existence of probable cause to believe that the law has been
violated, and whether or not the agency must show that a defendant
from whom information is sought comes within the coverage of the stat-
ute which the agency is administering.
In Bowles v. Insel, 164 a circuit court of appeals recently asserted,
. . it is settled that without a showing of probable cause to believe
that the law has been violated and specific description of the papers and
records to be produced, a subpoena requiring the production of private
papers is violative of the provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures." For this proposition the court cited four decisions of the Su-
Contra: Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929); EX parte Patterson,
110 Ark. 94, 161 S.W. 173 (1913); Brown v. Davidson, 59 Iowa 461, 13 N.W. 442
(1882) ; Noyes v. Byxbee, 45 Conn. 382 (1877).
155. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
156. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1937) ; Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
157. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
158. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,
264 U.S. 298 (1924); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
159. McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 389 (C.C.A. 10th 1945);,Fleming v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (C.C.A. 7th 1940), cert denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940) ; Newfield
v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (C.C.A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 729 (1937), 36 Micu. L.
RFv. 786 (1938).
160. NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F.2d 583 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 55 HARV. L. REv. 134;
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); Jones v. SEC, 298 U. S. 1
(1936) ; Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
161. ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 195 (1912); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.,
285 Fed. 936 (App. D.C. 1923), reVd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927).
162. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-5 (1941) ; FTC v. Baltimorc Grain
Co., 284 Fed. 886 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1924); Bowles v. Glick Bros.
Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (C.C.A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945).
163. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942).
164. 148 F.2d 91, 92 (C.C.A. 3d 1945).
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preme Court, all of which tend to support the statement but none of
which holds that a court must make a finding of probable cause before
enforcing a subpoena duces tecum. The Boyd case contains a dictum
that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers" "I may contravene the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and provides that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.
. . ." As a matter of logic, if compulsory production of records is
deemed to be a search and seizure, and if probable cause is required for
a warrant authorizing search and seizure, then probable cause must be
required for compelling the production of records. The Rale case CI of
1906, again by way of dictum, corroborates the Boyd dictum. The gen-
eral tenor of the opinion in the American Tobacco case "- of 1924 is
consistent with the view that a showing of probable cause must be
made, but the holding is merely that the subpoena was too broad. In
the Jones case of 1936 the Court declared: "The citizen, when interro-
gated about his private affairs, has a right before answering to know
why the inquiry is made. ... An investigation not based upon speci-
fied grounds is quite as objectionable as a search warrant not based up-
on specific statements of fact. . . ." "I Yet the narrow holding in the
Jones case is merely that where an agency's announced purpose in in-
vestigating is held unlawful the agency may not continue the investi-
gation.
Despite their weaknesses, these four cases in the aggregate seem to
be fairly substantial. Yet the opposing authorities are now stronger.
In Bowles v. Insel, Il after the court made the observation above quoted
it proceeded to hold that records required by statute to be kept open
to inspection are not private but are "quasi-public" and therefore may
be inspected without a showing of probable cause. The concept of
"quasi-public" records, as we have seen, 170 is gaining increasing accept-
ance. But even irrespective of the question whether or not records are
regarded as "quasi-public," disclosure may now be required without
a showing of probable cause. In the Oklahoma Press case 171 the Su-
preme Court ignored the distinction between records required to be
kept and other records and asserted that the Fair Labor Standards Ad-
ministrator must perform an investigative function which is "essen-
tially the same as the grand jury's, or the court's in issuing other pre-
trial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same
165. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (186).
166. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
167. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
168. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 26, 27 (1936).
169. 148 F.2d 91 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945).
170. See pp. 1136-8, supra.
171. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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limitations." 172 The Court applied the view it had previously taken
with respect to a grand jury investigation-that the inquiry must not
be "limited . . . by forecasts of the probable result of the investiga-
tion." "I The Supreme Court first announced this view as recently as
1946, but at that time the law had virtually become settled to that ef-
fect even in absence of a Supreme Court holding. The leading case is
Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., in which a circuit court of appeals
carefully discussed previous authorities and concluded: "When Con-
gress, acting in the public interest, has the power to regulate and super-
vise the conduct of any particular business under the commerce clause,
an administrative agency may be authorized to inspect books and re-
cords and to require disclosure of information regardless of whether the
business is a public utility and regardless of whether there is any pre-
existing probable cause for believing that there has been a violation of
the law." 174 The holding was an especially strong one because the com-
pany was specifically denied opportunity to present evidence showing
lack of probable cause to believe the company had violated the Act.
If the spirit of this holding was inconsistent with that of earlier deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, the inference is that the law was changing,
for other decisions of the 1940's support the Montgomery Ward deci-
sion. Thus, another circuit court of appeals resolved this problem with
a mere remark that "the existence of probable cause for believing that
the Act has been violated is not made a prerequisite to inspection." 17
It has been held that the National Labor Relations Board may secure
enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum issued after a charge has been
filed with the Board but before the Board has served a complaint, the
purpose of the subpoena being to get information bearing on the ques-
tion whether or not a complaint should be issued. "I The grand jury
analogy has been increasingly relied upon. 177 The view that produc-
tion of records may be compelled without a showing of probable cause
has gained further support from holdings that subpoenas duces tecum
172. Id. at 216.
173. Ibid.
174. 114 F.2d 384, 390 (C.C.A. 7th 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
175. Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566, 571 (C.C.A. 9th 1945), cerl.
denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945).
176. NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F2d 583 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 55 HARv. L. REv. 134.
The dissenting judge declared: "It would be a procedure, however, with which I am not
familiar, for a prosecuting attorney, upon receiving a complaint, to arm himself with a
subpoena directing the suspected person to appear at his office with books and records and
to submit to examination all for the purpose of determining whether he should be charged
with an offense." Id. at 588.
177. See, e.g., Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704, 708 (C.C.A. 9th 1938); Wool-
ley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (C.C.A. 9th 1938) : "The Securities and Exchange
Commission, as a fact-finding body, performs a function similar to that of a grand jury
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may be issued for purposes other than law enforcement or adjudica-
tion, 178 and from holdings that third parties may be required to give
evidence 9 and do not even have standing to question the jurisdiction
of the tribunal or the propriety of the investigation. 1 1
The second important question concerning the extent of judicial in-
quiry in enforcing administrative subpoenas is whether or not the
agency must show that a defendant from whom information is sought
comes within the coverage of the statute which the agency is admin-
istering. Since a third party may be required to furnish information
relevant to an inquiry which the agency is authorized to make, the
question here relates only to the jurisdiction of the agency over parties
in the position of defendants. The leading case is Eudicolt Johnson
Corp. v. Perkiis, "I' holding that a district court in enforcing a sub-
poena should not take evidence on the issue of coverage but that a
pleading of the administrative authority alleging "reason to believe"
that the defendant and the subject matter are covered by the statute
is sufficient for the entry of an order enforcing the subpoena. The ques-
tion arose under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, requiring
those who contract to supply materials to the Government to observe
certain labor standards in the performance of the contract. The cor-
poration had contracted to supply materials and admitted an obliga-
tion to comply with the Act in certain of its plants. But the informa-
tion sought through the subpoena related to other plants in which,
according to an allegation of the Secretary of Labor, there was reason
to believe persons were employed in the performance of the contracts
with the Government. The corporation denied this allegation. The
district court, on the Secretary's application for an order enforcing the
subpoena, denied the Secretary's motion for an order on the pleadings
and accompanying affidavits, and set the case for trial on the question
whether the Act covered the particular plants. 182 The Supreme Court
held not only that the district court lacked authority to decide the
question of coverage but also that the district court lacked authority
to control the Secretary's procedure to the extent of requiring as a con-
dition to enforcement of the subpoena that the Secretary must first
reach and announce a decision on the coverage question.
Some authority supports each of three views concerning the extent
to which the enforcing court should inquire into the question of cover-
age: (1) the court may take evidence and decide for itself the coverage
issue; (2) the court may go to the opposite extreme and refuse to con-
178. See discussion pp. 1120-6, supra.
179. McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 389 (C.C.A. 10th 1945).
180. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
181. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
182. 37 F. Supp. 604 (N.D.N.Y. 1941), 40 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.N.Y. 1941). The circuit
court of appeals reversed. 128 F.2d 208 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
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sider the question o coverage, inquiring no further than to ascertain
whether the information sought is relevant to any lawful purpose of the
administrative authority; or (3) the court may take a middle view and
inquire only into the question of probable legal justification for order-
ing the information to be produced. The district court took the first
position. The unanimous circuit court of appeals and the Supreme
Court adopted the second. Two dissenting Justices advocated the
third. 183 Especially significant is the Supreme Court's unanimity in
rejecting the view of the district court, a view which had been adopted
by a circuit court of appeals in a case involving the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act. 184
Ih the majority opinion the Supreme Court took care to point out:
"The evidence sought by the subpoena was not plainly incompetent
or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the Secretary in the discharge
of her duties under the'Act .. ." 185 This statement implies that the
enforcing court should inquire whether or not the information sought
is plainly irrelevant to any lawful purpose which the agency might have.
But the majority opinion seems very clear that the inquiry of the en-
forcing court should go no further. And the decision embraces more
than the mere proposition that an agency necessarily has jurisdiction
to secure information to assist it in determining the scope of its juris-
diction. That proposition was an essential part of the Court's reason-
ing, but the Court instead of stopping there went on to declare and to
hold that the district court may not disable the Secretary from render-
ing a complete decision, that is, from securing information bearing not
only on the question of jurisdiction but also on the merits. When the
question of coverage is difficult or complex, the Secretary "might find
183. Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Mr. Justice Roberts concurred, said that the
district court should "inquire and satisfy itself whether there is probable legal justification
for the proceeding, before it exercises its judicial authority to require a witness or a party
to reveal his private affairs or be held in contempt." 317 U.S. 501, 515 (1943). Although
this idea is the mainstay of the dissenting opinion, yet at one point the dissenting Justices
say that the compulsory disclosure depends upon the question of coverage and that the
corporation "was entitled to have this question determined by the district court before the
subpoena was enforced over its objection." Id. at 517. This language is a virtual adoption
of the view of the district court but seems inconsistent with the main tenor of the dissent-
ing opinion.
184. General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599 (C.C.A. 6th 1942),
holding that "it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended that one who, when
called upon to produce his books and records, denies that he is engaged in transactions
within the purview of the Act should be refused a hearing upon that issue before his
privacy is invaded in derogation of his individual immunity from unreasonable search of
his papers and effects." The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Endicott Johnson
case partly because of a probable conflict with the General Tobacco case. See Note, 149
A. L. R. 194 (1944).
185. 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
[Vol. 56: 11111146
1947] ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION 1147
it advisable to begin by examining the payroll, for if there were no
underpayments found, the issue of coverage would be academic."
The decision thus permits the Secretary to compel disclosure of in-
formation concerning the amount of wages paid in plants which even
the Secretary may upon investigation find to be beyond the Secretary's
jurisdiction, or which a reviewing court may later find to be beyond the
Secretary's jurisdiction, and the only way the corporation may suc-
cessfully resist the order compelling the disclosure is by showing that
the evidence sought is "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful
purpose of the Secretary." The Court's rejection of the view of the
dissenting Justices that the enforcing court "should first satisfy itself
that probable cause exists for the Secretary's contention that the Act
covers the plants in qutstion"'18 emphasizes that even a showing of
probable coverage is unnecessary.
After the decision of the Endicott Johnson case, much confusion de-
veloped on the question whether the principles there established were
limited to the administration of the WNalsh-Healey Act or were of gen-
eral applicability. 187 The doubts were resolved by the Supreme Court
in the Okialwina Press decision. In the two cases there before the Court
the questions were "whether any showing is required beyond the Ad-
ministrator's allegations of coverage and relevance of the required
materials to that question; and, if so, of what character. Stated other-
wise, they are whether the court may order enforcement only upon a
finding of 'probable cause,' that is, probability in fact, of coverage
. ..," 18s In one of the two cases "probable cause" was clearly shown
and accordingly the judgment of the court below was affirmed; in the
other case it was "doubtful" whether the showing would constitute
"probable cause," and therefore the Supreme Court had to determine
what showing was necessary. The Court held: "Congress has made no
requirement in terms of any showing of 'probable cause'; and, in view
of what has already been said, any possible constitutional requirement
of that sort was satisfied by the Administrator's showing in this case,
including not only the allegations concerning coverage, but also that he
was proceeding with his investigation in accordance with the mandate
of Congress and that the records sought were relevant to that pur-
pose." "I The view so fully developed in the Endicott Johnson case is
186. Id. at 517.
187. Ten lower court cases are cited in the opinion in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192 (1946).
188. Id. at 214.
189. Id. at 215-6. The Court went on to point out that in view of the Courts holding
the same day in 'Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) that a pub-
lisher who sends one-half of one per cent of his publication outside the state is engaged
in production of goods for interstate commerce under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
showing was sufficient to show coverage itself, though that .%-as not required. The Court
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thus generally applicable, unless a specific statutory provision calls
for a different result. 190
The lone dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy in the Oklahoma Press case
deserves special mention, because it is probably one of the most extreme
pronouncements that has ever come from the Supreme Court bench:
"... I am unable to approve the use of non-judicial subpoenas issued
by administrative agents . ..Only by confining the subpoena power
exclusively to the judiciary can there be any insurance against .. .
corrosion of liberty." 191 One obvious difficulty with this view is that
even if the subpoena power is confined exclusively to the judiciary, the
result is that supboenas are issued not by judges but by clerks of court
and by the assistants who work in clerks' offices. For instance, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that clerks "shall" issue on
the request of a party both subpoenas for witnesses and subpoenas for
records, "signed and sealed but otherwise in blank." 192 If issuance of
subpoenas by anyone but a judge is dangerous to liberty, then the tra-
ditional system of the regular courts, which seemingly operates to the
satisfaction of all concerned, must be radically changed.
The Administrative Procedure Act muddies a bit the waters made
clear by the Endicott Johnson and Oklahoma Press cases. The words of
the Act seem wholly innocuous: "Upon contest the court shall sustain
any such subpena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is
found to be in accordance with law and, in any proceeding for enforce-
ment, shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or
the production of the evidence or data within a reasonable time under
continued: "The result therefore sustains the Administrator's position that his investiga-
tive function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act,
is essentially the same as the grand jury's, or the court's in issuing other pretrial orders
for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations. These are that he
shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority, but this does not mean
that his inquiry must be 'limited ...by forecasts of the probable result of the investiga-
tion ...'" See also Provenzano v. Porter, 159 F.2d 47 (C.C.A. 9th 1946), cert. denied,
67 Sup. Ct. 1303 (1947).
190. The decisions in the Endicott Johnson and Oklahoma Press cases make clear that
the Administrator may compel production of records by a defendant who may ultimately
be found to be beyond the coverage of the statute. The basic principle involved is more
clearly developed in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), holding
that a court may not enjoin the National Labor Relations Board from conducting a hear-
ing upon a complaint alleging unfair labor practices, even if the company was not subject
to the Act. The place to prove that the company is beyond the Board's jurisdiction is be-
fore the Board or in the reviewing court. See Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938), where the Court referred to "the abiding and
fundamental principle. . . that the expense and annoyance of litigation is 'part of the
social burden of living under government."' But cf. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
191. 327 U.S: 186, 218-9 (1946).
192. FE. R. Civ. P., 45(a).
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penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to
comply." 193 The difficulty comes not from the words but from the
legislative history of this provision. Congressman Walter, sponsoring
the bill in the House, said that the effect of this provision is "to do more
than merely restate the existing constitutional safeguards .. " 14
But the Attorney General had previously said that the provision "is
intended to state the existing law with respect to the judicial enforce-
ment of subpenas." "I And the Attorney General by later memoran-
dum introduced by Mr. Hobbs said: "The law as expounded in Endicott
Johnson v. Perkins is still applicable. All that this section requires is
that the court determine whether the subpena issued comes within
the general power of that agency. There need be no in limine inquiries
as to whether the person subpenaed is or is not covered by the act." 11
Statements by Senate and House committees seem to support the At-
torney General's interpretation. 197
DIscLosURE OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC
Furnishing information to an administrative agency is not the
equivalent of disclosing that information to the public, and the ques-
tion often arises whether or not an agency should keep confidential the
facts which have been made known to it. Statutory provisions making
it a misdemeanor for any officer or employee of an agency improperly
to disclose information are very common. 1"3 For instance, the Secur-
ities Exchange Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any member,
officer, or employee of the Commission to disclose to any person other
than a member, officer or employee of the Commission, or to use for
personal benefit any information contained in any application, report,
193. 60 STAT. 238, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(c) (Supp. 1946).
194. Mr. Walter said: "Where administrative subpenas are contested, the court is to
inquire into the situation and issue an order of enforcement only so far as the subpena is
found to be in accordance with law ... The effect of the subsection is thus to do more
than merely restate the existing constitutional safeguards which in some Cases, such as
those involving public contractors--see Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perbins (317 U.S. 501,
507, 509, 510 (1943)) have been held inapplicable. Also, the term 'in accordance with
law' . . . means that the legal situation, including the necessary facts, demonstrates that
the persons and subject matter to which the subpena is directed are within the jurisdic-
tion of the agency which has issued the subpena." Sen. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 363 (1946). The Oklahoma Press case had come down three months earlier.
195. Id. at 227.
196. Id. at 415.
197. Id. at 206, 265. See Nathanson, Some Comments on Ilhe Admidnisraivo Proec-
dure Act, 41 ILL. L. RLv. 368, 409-10 (1946).
198. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE CommissroN Acr, 38 STAT. 724 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 50
(1940). In Note, 51 HAgv. L. Rv. 312, 320 n. 53 (1937), it is said that "practically all
statutes creating administrative commissions make it unlawful for any member or em-
ployee to disclose any information which is not published in the public interest."
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or document filed with the Commission which is not made available to
the public pursuant to . .. this section ... ." "I Statutory protec-
tion against revelation of trade secrets is customary. 20 Sometimes
elaborate provisions of statutes and regulations control the precise con-
ditions under which and the parties to whom information may be re-
vealed. A good example is the Internal Revenue Code, permitting
income tax returns to be open to inspection only upon order of the Pres-
ident and under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary and
approved by the President; the statute itself permits inspection of re-
turns by certain state officers and by specified congressional commit-
tees, permits inspection of corporate returns by shareholders, and pro-
vides penalties for wrongful use or disclosure of information by those
who inspect returns. 201 Another provision allows publication of com-
pensation of corporate officers and employees receiving in excess of
$75,000. 202 A provision of a former revenue Act allowing publication
of all income tax returns has been upheld. 203
Some statutes allow administrative agencies in their discretion to
release information to the public. Provisions of this kind are included
.in such statutes as the Federal Trade Commission Act, 204 the Civil
Aeronautics Act, 205 the Emergency Price Control Act, 20 the Secur-
ities Exchange Act, 27 and the Public Utility Holding Company Act.200
199. 48 STAT. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78x (1940).
200. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §46 (1940),
gives the Commission power "to make public from time to time such portions of the in-
formation obtained by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it
shall deem expedient in the public interest." The Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49
STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79v (1940), protects against "the revealing of trade secrets
or processes.. ..
201. 53 STAT. 49, 26 U.S.C. § 55 (1940).
202. 52 STAT. 516 (1938), 26 U.S.C. § 148(f) (1940).
203. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378 (1925) ; Hubbard v. Mellon, 5 F.2d 764
(App. D. C. 1925). See Note, 151 A. L. R. 1049 (1944).
204. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1940).
205. 52 STAT. 1026 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 674 (1940), providing that whenever written
objection to public disclosure is made, "the Board shall order such information withheld
from public disclosure when, in its judgment, a disclosure of such information would ad-
versely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public."
206. 56 STAT. 30 (1942), as amended, 58 STAT. 637 (1944), 50 U.S.C. § 922(h)
(1944) : "The Administrator shall not publish or disclose any information obtained under
this Act that such Administrator deems confidential or with reference to which a request
for confidential treatment is made by the person furnishing such information, unless he
determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the interest of the national defense
and security."
207. 48 STAT. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78x (1940), permitting disclosure when in the
judgment of Securities and Exchange Commission it is "in the public interest," but mak-
ing no provision concerning a hearing on the question of disclosure.
208. 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79v (1940), permitting disclosure when in judg-
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The Securities and Exchange Commission has held that the latter
provision does not apply to a record of evidence at a hearing, that
objections to disclosure must be filed contemporaneously vith the
filing of information to secure the benefit of this provision, and that
methods of conducting an investment company business are not trade
secrets.29 During a recent year the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, under the various statutes it administers, granted 123 appli-
cations for confidential treatment and denied 22.21 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that a Commission
determination to make public disclosure is judicially reviewable,211
but that if the evidence leaves the question of injurious effects from
the disclosure "in the realm of doubt and speculation" the court will
refuse to upset the Commission's judgment..2 12 The court's opinion
in this case, discussing the question whether disclosure of gross sales
and cost of goods sold would cause a buyers' strike, seems implicitly to
place the burden upon the party asserting that disclosure i.ll be in-
jurious, and demonstrates the extreme difficulty of sustaining that
burden.
213
Probably most of the information coming into the possession of
administrative agencies is not subject to any statutory provision con-
cerning disclosure. 214 In Bank of America National Trust & Say. Ass'n
v. Douglas,2 1 5 the Securities and Exchange Commission secured in-
ment of Securities and Exchange Commission it is "in the public interest," and authoriz-
ing Commission to conduct hearing "in any such case where it finds it advisable."
209. Utilities Employees Securities Co., 3 S.E.C. 1037 (1933).
210. 12 SEC ANN. REP. 128 (1947).
211. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236 (App. D.C. 1937). The
statute provided that "the Commission is authorized to hear objections in any such case
where it deems it advisable." 48 STAT. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1940). Since the
statute thus permitted the Commission to determine the question without a hearing, it vas
arguable that the Commission's determination ought not to be judicially reviewed. See
Comment, Confidential Trcatnent of Information Rcquired by the Secnuitics Exiange
Act, 47 YA4m L. J. 790 (1938); Lane and Blair-Smith, The SEC and the "Expcditions
Settlement of Disputes," 34 ILT. L. REv. 699, 714-5 (1940).
212. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 110 F2d 117, 121 (App. D.C. 1940).
.. If the conclusion reached is just as likely to be correct as incorrect, it is our duty
to let it stand." Id. at 120.
213. Indeed, thorough investigation may often reveal a complete lack of support for the
view that disclosure of information relating to such items as gross sales and cost of goods
sold will cause injury to a business. An investigation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission revealed that such information has little to do with the motivating force
which determines buying policies or price competition. Frequently such figures are not
secret but are already on file in various state capitals for purposes of state taxation. See
the interesting account of the SEC's investigation into this subject in LA.uIs, Tim AD-
SmiNisTRA=Iw PRocEsS 42-5 (1938).
214. See Note, Inqidsitorial Powers of Federal Adinistratite Agncies, 43 YAu L. J.
1427, 1430 (1939).
215. 105 F.2d 100 (App. D.C. 1939), 132 F2d 9 (App. D.C. 1942). The court re-
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formation from bank examiners' reports to the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Secretary of the Treasury. After holding that under
the aplicable statute and regulations the information had been prop-
erly released to the Commission, the court was confronted with the
problem whether or not the Commission, in absence of controlling
legislation, could make public information concerning a bank which,
if true, might lead to criminal prosecutions. The court relied upon the
custom of keeping reports of bank examiners confidential and held
that the Comiission might use the information in preparing for a
hearing but should not make pretrial publication of the information.
The court remarked that "certainly until findings are made, the
Bank is entitled to have judgment, public and official, suspended." 210
Accepting the Commission's assurance that the information would
not be introduced in evidence at a public hearing, the court held that
no injunction was necessary. The case shows that at least in some cir-
cumstances a court may without statutory assistance require that
information in the possession of an administrative agency be kept
confidential. 2 17 Agencies themselves, of course, may make investiga-
tion proceedings private, excluding the public.
2 18
In some circumstances a court may be wholly unsympathetic to the
urge for keeping business facts confidential. Thus it has been held that
a company charged with false and fraudulent advertising and unfair
trade methods has no right to protection against publicity resulting
from holding a public hearing.219 Despite a contention of a water car-
rier that the Secretary of Commerce intended to turn records over to
the public and that communication of the records to competitors
would damage the carrier's business, and despite the Secretary's re-
jection of the carrier's offer to submit the records on condition that
they be not communicated to competitors, the Supreme Court denied
an injunction against enforcement of an order requiring the carrier to
file information showing commodities carried, points of shipment and
destination, rates charged or collected, and other such information.
20
quired the administrative proceeding to be transferred from Washington to San Fran-
cisco. On that aspect of the case see Note, 28 CAWr. L. Ray. 240 (1940).
216. Id. at 105.
217. Cf. Hearts of Oak Assurance Co. v. Attorney-General, [1932] A.C. 392, rebuking
an examiner for holding a public hearing with members of press present, thereby hurting
the interests of policy holders for whose protection the legislation being administered had
been enacted. In Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933), the Supreme Court upheld the Tariff Commission in keeping business facts confi-
dential even as against another party to a hearing.
218. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) ; Woolley v. United States, 97
F.2d 258 (C.C.A. 9th 1938). In the Baer case it was held that the district court had no
authority to order the hearing to be conducted in public.
219. E. Griffiths Huges, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362 (App. D.C. 1933).
220. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1937).
[Vol. 56;111111152
1947] ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION 1153
Similarly, when the Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to a con-
gressional resolution authorizing an investigation into the financial
condition of farmers, refused to give assurance to a company that in-
formation would not be disclosed to the public or to competitors or
customers, a district court nevertheless granted mandamus command-
ing the company to answer detailed questionnaires concerning such
items as purchases, sales, prices, costs, balance sheets, income and ex-
pense statements, and salaries of officers.
22'
SUARY AND CONCLUSIONS
No longer do federal courts in the name of civil liberties place sub-
stantial barriers in the way of administrative agencies which seek busi-
ness facts deemed necessary to the proper performance of administra-
tive tasks. A half century of congressional insistence upon a broad
administrative power of investigation has at last overpowered the
judicial effort to protect business privacy. A few decades ago the
judges wrote into the Constitution the idea that disclosures could be
required only in connection with adjudication and law enforcement,
but the Constitution now permits use of subpoenas to support in-
vestigations for any lawfully authorized purpose-for maldng rules,
for recommending legislation, for determining policy, for trying to
find out whether something ought to be done and if so what. Consti-
tutional restrictions on searches and seizures and self-incrimination
until recent times frequently prevented agencies from securing needed
information, but those restrictions are now rewritten so as to affect.
only negligibly the issuance and enforcement of orders compelling
disclosure of such records as are relevant to a legitimate investigation.
Courts in recent years are freely permitting much of what courts a
generation- ago condemned as fishing expeditions. Agencies whose
regulatory powers rest on the commerce clause are no longer prohibited
from investigating intrastate activities. The old Constitution often
thwarted investigations of businesses which were deemed not to be
"affected with a public interest," but this concept has disappeared,
and in its place is the idea that records which a statute requires to be
kept are "quasi-public" and cannot be withheld from official inspec-
tion. Unlike a number of state agencies which have power to punish
for contempt, all federal agencies still must rely on courts for enforce-
ment of subpoenas, but courts now enforce administrative subpoenas
without requiring a showing either of probable cause to believe the
law has been violated or of probable jurisdiction of the agency. Stat-
utes and case law provide appropriate protection against improper
administrative disclosure of information to the public.
221. FTC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See Note,
Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 H~nv. L. REv. 1214 (1941).
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Some will see in the abrupt change of law an alarming breakdown of
constitutional protection against oppressive exercise of the bureau-
cratic inquisitorial power. Petty officials may now enter a business
establishment, demand that records and documents be made available
for their inspection and enforce the demand by securing a court order
requiring disclosure-even in absence of probable cause to believe the
law has been violated. Is this not a revival in modem garb of the
odious writs of assistance which helped ignite the fire of the American
Revolution?
Others -will look at the same developments and see only an inevitable
concomitant of industrial revolution-delayed somewhat by backward-
looking judges. Each step follows inexorably: Industrialization brings
regulation. Regulation necessitates administrative processes. Agencies
cannot operate without access to facts. Ideas about privacy, standing
in the way of agencies which seek information indispensable to in-
telligent regulation, have to give way. In the same way that the gaso-
line engine made inevitable the development of the airplane, mass
production methods and all they symbolize produced complex business
arrangements which brought forth equally intricate governmental
mechanisms requiring effective exercise of the administrative power
of investigation. And as for civil liberties, compulsory disclosure of
business facts is entirely consistent with giving full protection against
the kind of unreasonable searches and seizures which were in the minds
of the wise men who wrote the Fourth Amendment.
22 2
On this grand issue the Constitution has changed sides. It is now,
for better or worse, on the side of the democratic will.
222. Such problems as that involved in the highly controversial five-to-four decision in
Harris v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947), may be determined on their merits quite
independently of the solutions of such problems as we have considered. Many who would
hesitate the least in upholding administrative power to secure business information would
take the strongest position against the search and seizure upheld by the majority in the
Harris case.
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